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BBC 'IT'S YOUR WORLD' PROGRAM FEATURES KARPOV

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["It's Your World" live phone-in program with Viktor Karpov, head of the USSR Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate, speaking from Moscow in English -- moderated by Sue MacGregor in London]

[Text] [MacGregor] The first caller today is in France, in (Valle Orice), and he is Mr Charles Banks. Mr Banks, your question please to Viktor Karpov:

[Banks] Mr Karpov, how realistic is the claim that the possession of nuclear weapons has kept the peace between East and West in the past 40 years, or do you feel that there are deeper reasons why peace has been kept?

[Karpov] I think that there are deeper reasons than the existence of nuclear weapons. I think that after World War II we all felt that what happened during the war shouldn't be repeated in any way. So, the Soviet Union on its side worked for such a solution that war in Europe be eliminated, and we felt that the accumulation of nuclear weapons now in Europe reached such a level when the danger of unleashing a war in Europe inevitably will become a war -- a nuclear war -- so we felt that we should deal with nuclear weapons radically now, eliminate them. And Europe now presents a very good example that can be followed by other countries and other regions of the world. So, to start there by eliminating nuclear weapons means to help eliminate the danger of war in Europe.

[MacGregor] Mr Banks in France, would you like to come back to Mr Karpov?

[Banks] Well, I am very happy with that reply. I presume that Mr Karpov would say that since Chernobyl the situation really becomes more starkly obvious.

[Karpov] Yes, I agree with you that people on the example of Chernobyl saw the real risks of any war in Europe whatsoever, without the use of nuclear weapons because we have in Europe more than 150 nuclear reactors. If they are hit by conventional weapons it is disaster.

[MacGregor] Mr Karpov, if I may just add a supplementary question to the one that Mr Banks made. You do, perhaps, understand the fear amongst certain NATO countries that if all medium-range nuclear weapons are eliminated from Europe they will be left vulnerable to what they see as a vast superiority of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

[Karpov] I heard such arguments, but I do not believe them, in fact, because parallel to the proposals on eliminating medium-range weapons from Europe we suggest that conventional weapons be reduced, and be reduced in a way that won't exclude a possibility of unleashing a conventional war, so that the reductions be so drastic and verifiable that any offensive operations by NATO or the Warsaw Pact countries be excluded. [sentence as heard]

[MacGregor] Well, verification I am sure is a question we will come back to on this program. Thank you Mr Banks in France. We now move to Darwin in Australia. We have a call from Marie Hathaway. Your question please, Marie Hathaway.

[Hathaway] No, it's Mark Hathaway, actually.

[(MacGregor)] It is Mark Hathaway. I am sorry, not only did I get your name wrong, but your sex wrong. I beg your pardon, Mr Hathaway. Your question please.

[Hathaway] Mr Karpov. Actually verifiability is the theme of my question. Would you mind giving some of the Soviet Union's proposed methods of verifying any arms reductions that are agreed to?

[Karpov] You see we suggest a wide range of measures to verify starting with the national technical means which are in the process of improvement all the time. And we suggest that these be added by various international verification methods including on-site inspection. So, the verification methods, of course, would be agreed upon with the methods of reduction so that every party to that agreement on reduction of weapons can feel sure that there is no violation whatsoever.

[(MacGregor)] Mr Hathaway.

[Hathaway] So, in effect, you would not be having inspection teams or anything like that...the Soviet Union's people visiting NATO installations or U.S. installations or vice versa?

[Karpov] We suggest that verification measures -- and on-site inspections included -- should be applied to all the parties of the agreement. So, of course, you would have an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on reduction of their forces in Europe. Of course we accept verification by NATO teams on our territory and vice versa -- NATO countries should accept Soviet and Warsaw Pact verification teams as well.

[(MacGregor)] Of course, Mr Karpov, as you know, America is very bothered by how much verification the Soviet Union would like and the U.S. is pushing some very specific measures including almost instant on-site inspection. Would this be acceptable to the Soviet Union?

[Karpov] Yes. It would be acceptable. In fact, we suggested, for instance, that measures on elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe be from the very start accompanied by possibilities of on-site inspection on the places where the destruction or disbanding measures be carried out.

[(MacGregor)] Are there not areas of the Soviet Union, though, that are closed not only to foreigners but to Soviet citizens too? Would that not be a problem?

[Karpov] You see, I think that when we agree on the verification measures, these verification measures should not be hindered by any restrictions. So verification should be omnipotent, so to stay, and be carried out in a way that no circumvention of the agreement be possible.

[(MacGregor)] So openness on both sides. Complete openness.

[Karpov] Yes, sure.

[(MacGregor)] Thank you Mr Karpov and Mr Hathaway in Darwin, Australia.

[MacGregor] We now have a question from Belgium -- from Brussels, Mr (Mukesh Patel). Mr (Patel), your line to Mr Karpov.

[(Patel)] Good evening, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Hello.

[(Patel)] What influence does the recent landing of a light plane in the Red Square have on Soviet defense strategy?

[Karpov] On Soviet defense ... ?

[(Patel)] Strategy.

[Karpov] Ah, strategy. [laughs] You see, we feel that incident, of course, is an example of some lapses in the military defense of the Soviet Union... [changes thought] in the antiaircraft defense. Maybe that should be corrected, but we feel that here lies the necessity for more agreements that would guarantee that no such incidents will take place, in fact. So, more openness, more possibilities for cooperation in such things as the guaranteeing of the nonviolation of frontiers and such things that will increase credibility and increase the confidence-building process.

[MacGregor] Mr (Patel) in Brussels, were you happy with that answer?

[(Patel)] Yes, fairly happy, except that I think I would like to add that, in my personal opinion, the element of coexistence in any defense strategy is the key to the peaceful evolution of mankind, and I certainly hope that this is what the nucleus of the Soviet defense strategy is.

[Karpov] Yes, and I agree with you. And, recently in Berlin the Warsaw Pact countries proposed to NATO countries to have meetings to discuss the strategies of both blocs in order to establish a possibility of agreeing on nonoffensive strategy.

[MacGregor] Mr (Patel), thank you for your question. Before we leave the very interesting question of the Cessna which landed in Red Square, it was, of course, something that led to the replacement of Marshal Sokolov as the defense minister in the Soviet Union, the sacking of Marshal Kudinov as commander in chief of the Soviet air defense forces, which was quite drastic in some people's eyes. Mr Karpov, what has happened to Mr Mathias Rust, the young pilot? What is his position at the moment?

[Karpov] He is under arrest in Moscow because under the Soviet Penal Code the violation of the Soviet frontier is punishable. So, now the investigation is going on and then he will stand trial if the legal authorities decide that he should stand trial. But, maybe there will be some other measures applied to him, maybe extradition, I don't know, that will be decided by the legal authorities.

[MacGregor] So, for the moment he is still in prison in Moscow?

[Karpov] Yes.

[MacGregor] Thank you Mr Karpov. Now, we have a call from Buckinghamshire here in England from Mr (Matthew Humberston). Mr (Humberston), your question please.

[(Humberston)] I would like to ask Mr Karpov how does he rate Britain's nuclear capability?

[Karpov] Pardon? I didn't ...

[(Humberston)] How do you rate Britain's nuclear capability?

[MacGregor] You are talking, Mr (Humberston), of Britain's independent deterrent -- Polaris submarines?

[(Humberston)] Yes, yes.

[Karpov] You see, we feel that the British nuclear potential, of course, plays a certain and not so small role in the European nuclear equilibrium. But up to now, we are ready not to take into account this nuclear potential as far as the problem of medium-range missiles is concerned. But we feel that later on when the Soviet and American medium-range missiles are eliminated and the Soviet Union and the United States carried out the 50 percent reduction of their strategic offensive forces, I think that other nuclear powers should come into the picture, so to say, and participate in the talks to reduce nuclear forces on a multilateral basis. And, if they wish to participate in the negotiations, to eliminate them altogether.

[MacGregor] When you said, other nuclear powers, Mr Karpov, would you include France, and would you include China?

[Karpov] Sure. When we are dealing with the global situation China should be included, of course.

[MacGregor] What sort of forum would you consider appropriate?

[Karpov] It might be the conference of five nuclear powers as it was suggested already by Mr Gorbachev.

[MacGregor] So, this might be in Geneva again?

[Karpov] Oh, any place which would be convenient for that.

[MacGregor] Mr (Humberston) in Buckinghamshire, did that answer satisfy you? Would you like to ask another question?

[(Humberston)] Yes, it did, but, supposing, hypothetically, that Russia was an expansionist power, how would Britain be a suitable target, supposing, just hypothetically?

[Karpov] Target of what?

[(Humberston)] Of expansion. Would you ... is Britain desirable if you were an expansionist power?

[Karpov] Who is an expansionist power?

[MacGregor] Are you asking, Mr (Humberston), if the Soviet Union has it in mind to make Britain a satellite state of the Soviet Union?

[(Humberston)] Yes, I mean, yes, if it were an expansionist power?

[Karpov] [laughs] Who is an expansionist power in this case? Is it the Soviet Union or Britain?

[MacGregor] I think, he meant the Soviet Union, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] [laughs] Soviet Union is not an expansionist power, and we don't have any plan to wage war against Britain, or conquer it. Let the British people live in their country in peace and enjoy the better life and build that life. We are not interfering in that.

[MacGregor] Yes, Good morning, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Good morning.

[(Schulemberg)] I'm very glad to talk to you. As you would certainly agree, West Germany is particularly involved in these questions of reduction of nuclear weapons and so on. And as you will certainly know, there have been discussions between several members of the West German Government concerning the issue. So my question has got two parts. Firstly, I would like to hear your comment on that -- on these discussions, controversial discussions, within the German Government. And secondly, I would like to talk about the issue of reunification of Germany which has been brought up by a member of the coalition, concerning this disarmament. And also the issue of changes at the East-West German border in order to, you know, pull the Berlin Wall down, or whatsoever, within a great solution of nuclear safety in Europe. So, I would like to know what you think about these two points.

[MacGregor] Mr (Schulemberg). You asked two very large questions there. Let us separate them into two, as you suggest.

[(Schulemberg)] Yes, yes.

[MacGregor] The first question, I think you were inviting Mr Karpov to comment on the recent agreement by the West German coalition government to take part in the NATO discussions next week, I think you implied that.

[(Schulemberg)] Yes.

[MacGregor] And to agree to the zero option as long as the Pershing-1A's remained on West German soil?

[Schulemberg] Yes.

[MacGregor] Right, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Yes, this decision, we may hope that it is a decision to participate inside the process of making the Soviet-American agreement more realistic and possible. But I feel that as far as the West German Armed Forces are concerned, we are not having now in mind to include in the picture the West German missiles -- Pershing-1's. But we feel that as we deal with the United States on the medium-range missiles and operational tactical missiles, or the missiles on the range within the range of 500-1,000 km, we should deal with the American warheads, nuclear warheads, that are on West German soil and are warheads for those Pershing-1 missiles.

We feel that as we eliminate our Soviet missiles of that range -- 500-1,000 km -- why the Americans should retain warheads for missiles of this range?

[MacGregor] Yes, as you reminded...

[Karpov] It is only natural that these warheads should be eliminated.

[MacGregor] Mr (Schulemburg), would you like to comment on that briefly?

[(Schulemburg)] Well, no, that is alright. I would like to go on to the second part of my question.

[MacGregor] As Mr Karpov said, the Pershing-1 missiles are dual key control. In other words, they cannot be fired without American permission. Your second question was about the reunification of the two Germanys.

[(Schulemburg)] Well, it is that of course West German people is particularly involved, and several West German politicians brought up the question whether within a great solution of the European peace treaty or whatsoever, including disengagement of nuclear weapons, one should talk about reunification of Germany firstly, and secondly one should talk about the abolition of the Berlin Wall and the normalization at the border between East and West Germany, a situation which is not normal at all at the time being. [sentence as heard]

[Karpov] You say there are two German states, and of course the problem of reunification of Germany is the matter that can be decided only between them. So we feel that the improvement of relations between the two German states is the means that should be used here, and the frontier question that was mentioned here is, of course, a part of the improvement of relations between the two German states.

[MacGregor] Do you see the likelihood of the wall in Berlin being removed?

[Karpov] That depends upon the two states and their relations. If there is a possibility for such an agreement between the two Germanies, I think that might be done.

[MacGregor] Well, let us move on to a question from Malawi and from Mr (Basir Jogi) who is in Malawi. Mr (Jogi), your question please to Mr Karpov in Moscow.

[(Jogi)] Good morning, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Good morning.

[(Jogi)] My question is, if the USSR is concerned about peace why does it not do away with its nuclear forces, thereby setting an example?

[Karpov] I am afraid I did not get your question.

[MacGregor] I will repeat the question, Mr Karpov: If the Soviet Union is so desirous of peace, why does she not get rid of her nuclear weapons -- I assume he means unilaterally -- as an example to others?

[Karpov] You see, of course that is something fantastic. We cannot get rid of our nuclear weapons if the four other nuclear powers retain their nuclear weapons. Of course it is not possible now, in this situation of mistrust that exists. So we should cooperate in doing that [as heard] and only balanced reductions that would guarantee security of all is a possible way out to a denuclearized world.

[MacGregor] I think the line probably is not good enough to go back to Mr (Jogi) in Malawi, but I am sure he is still listening, Mr Karpov. I think a lot of people feel that it really is up to one of the superpowers to make the first move in good faith.

[Karpov] Any why not Britain? [laughs]

[MacGregor] Well, Britain is not sitting down in Geneva currently face-to-face with the Soviet Union...

[Karpov interrupts] Okay, then, why not the United States?

[MacGregor] Is it time, perhaps, for somebody to make an imaginative 'leap into the dark,' in a sense?

[Karpov] Of course, we have suggested that 'leap in the dark,' in fact. We have suggested to the United States to reduce our offensive nuclear weapons, strategic offensive nuclear weapons, by 50 percent in 5 years. Is it not imaginative?

[MacGregor] What about the likelihood of an agreement on intermediate-range forces -- which are being discussed of course in Geneva at the moment -- by the summer, as was predicted earlier this year? Do you think that is still on the cards?

[Karpov] We feel that an agreement on medium-range missiles is possible, and is possible soon if the United States will remove those obstacles that they introduced in their position that is on the table in Geneva. I would mention the examples of these unrealistic, in fact, positions that cannot be the basis for an agreement. First of all, that is the insistence of the United States on the conversion of medium-range missiles into missiles of less range in Europe so that keep them [as heard] in Europe together with all the infrastructure -- the launch sites and all the equipment that guarantees the launch of missiles. We know that reconversion is very simple and can be carried out within 48 hours, so in fact under this pretext medium-range missiles can be kept in Europe, in fact, and reintroduced very quickly. The second one is the insistence of the United States on keeping the cruise missiles, in fact, without warheads -- nuclear warheads -- on European soil, or removing them intact to ships, which means, in fact, no destruction of them and no reduction of nuclear forces. And the third one, the insistence of the United States to have their medium-range missiles in Alaska within the reach of the Soviet territory. In fact, that would increase the danger to the Soviet Union from the American side.

[MacGregor] But, of course...

[Karpov interrupts] ...(When) the Soviet Union will reduce nuclear forces of its own.

[MacGregor] But, of course, the Alaska agreement could be seen to be side-by-side with an agreement to allow the Soviet Union (?similar) warheads east of the Urals.

[Karpov] Then in Asia.

[MacGregor] In Asia. But all the points that you mentioned could perhaps be solved by proper verification procedures, could they not, Mr Karpov?

[Karpov] Of course the proper verification can be applied here, but in fact we would not like an agreement that would be agreement on elimination of medium-range weapons only in words and not in real life, so that is why we feel this position of the United States should be transformed into a position that would open the way for the agreement on the real reductions and elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

[MacGregor] Well, Mr (Jogi) in Malawi, I hope you heard Mr Karpov's answer. We now move to (Mere) in Wiltshire here in Great Britain. Dr (Alan Hart), your question, please to Mr Karpov.

[Hart] My question is I travel in the Soviet Union and speak to the Russian people quite freely, and I know that the Russian people after their terrible experiences from Napoleon to the Great Patriotic World War II have no desire for war. I am grieved to hear so many politicians saying that Russia, the USSR, is a potential enemy, and they quote various reasons: We must keep strong, we must not appease like we appeased Hitler in 1939, we must not disarm unilaterally. They criticize...

[MacGregor interrupts] Could you come to your question please, Dr (Hart)?

[Hart] What is your reaction to this statement of so many politicians and the reason they give for regarding Russia as a potential enemy?

[Karpov] You see various people that claim Russia is aggressive power and so on. I think they are guided by their own interests, political or other interests, and we in fact are for peace. We do not have aggressive designs or aggressive plans and now we are working for a better world with security for all and without the burden of the arms race and so for us that world means better life for the Soviet people, the better possibilities to expand, not what is called the Russian empire, but the life, the level of the Soviet people.

[MacGregor] Can I ask a question, not totally unrelated to that, but it has certainly to do with arms control, Mr Karpov? The question of chemical weapons. We heard in the news bulletin early today, which I am sure you heard on the BBC World Service that there is soon to be, there is probably soon to be a Russian initiative on the question of banning chemical weapons which would allow instant inspections as well, and this has of course in the past has been a stumbling block. Can you shed any light on that?

[Karpov] Yes, we suggested in Geneva during previous talks on chemical weapons a wide-range program for elimination of chemical weapons and strict verification measures to guarantee that there is no production of chemical weapons and the chemical weapons arsenals are destroyed. So now, one of the stumbling blocks there in Geneva is the problem how to verify some suspicious situations where some countries might have grounds to believe that some other participant of the convention on banning chemical weapons is circumventing the provisions of these conventions.

In fact, we support the British proposal introduced last June in Geneva on challenge inspections and we still are in that very position that we can cooperate with Britain on this question and can cooperate at the Geneva conference. The very problem now is that the United States insists on such a system of inspection which is unacceptable to the majority of the conference participants.

[MacGregor] But are you saying you would have agreed to challenge inspections?

[Karpov] Yes, we agree to challenge inspection and we agree that these inspection should be obligatory. There should not be the right to refuse such an inspection. What is now under discussion is how to guarantee to the countries the possibility of suggest alternative measures instead of on-site inspection to make the claimer the possibility to know that there is no violation and the suspicion is unfounded.
[sentence as heard]

[MacGregor] And will this be presented formally next week?

[Karpov] No, there is no such problem because we are now discussing, in fact we discussed these problems with the United States and with Britain for some time already. So there should be a consensus found here and we try to reach such consensus.

[MacGregor] So you see no real problem now in reaching an agreement on chemical weapons?

[Karpov] The problem is that we feel that some people in the United States have recently lost interest to agreement, maybe because they are planning to start the production of binary chemical weapons in October of this year. We do not know, but we notice such a tendency.

[MacGregor] This is something obviously to be discussed at Geneva.

[Karpov] Yes.

[MacGregor] Thank you Dr (Hart) in Wiltshire for your question from which we have strayed somewhat, but we will now move back to weapons in the more conventional sense and talk to (Klaus Sigabard) who is in (Lagas) in Portugal. Mr (Sigabard) your question please to Mr Karpov.

[(Sigabard)] Yes. Thank you very much. I would like to pose the following question to Mr Karpov: Since the nuclear armament appears to be a consequence of the conventional armament, would not it be a good idea to start dismantling the conventional armament on a scale much faster which is now being discussed at the MBFR in Vienna for instance.

[Karpov] Yes, I think that, as I mentioned already during the answer to that previous question, we suggest that parallel to the measures of elimination [as heard] nuclear weapons we discuss the possibility and the methods to reduce conventional weapons and conventional forces in Europe, starting in Europe, to levels that would guarantee the impossibility of unleashing aggression, (?unleashing) offensive so that NATO and Warsaw Pact have in Europe only such forces that will empower them to repulse an attack on the other side, [as heard] not more, not for an aggressive attack. So, we are ready to have guarantees of this process by implying strict verification measures that are needed for such resolution.

[MacGregor] Because currently, Mr Karpov, of course, the Warsaw Pact conventional forces outnumber the NATO ones by something like two to one, do they not?

[Karpov] No, it is not right. You see when the calculations are introduced by NATO, they usually discount the forces of France and Spain which number totally, both of them about 1 million personnel and a lot of weapons on the side of NATO. So if we take that into consideration, the number of conventional forces of both blocs will be roughly equal, about 3 million plus on each side.

[MacGregor] I see. That is not the figure that the International Institute for Strategic Studies here in Britain would agree with, I think, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] You see, sometimes we agree with the institute, sometimes we disagree when the secrets [as heard] introduced by the institute we do not consider right.

[MacGregor] Mr (Sigabard) in Portugal, would you like to come back on that question?

[(Sigabard)] Well, I would like to, maybe just enlarge on his last point, especially some reason what we know here, the number of armored vehicles in the USSR seems to be rather large, and probably much larger than necessary, but of course as you say, there seems to be a matter of interpretation of these figures.

[MacGregor] Yes, the figures I have in front of me for tanks and artillery say Warsaw Pact forces something like 70,000 tanks/artillery, NATO forces about 28,000.

[(Sigabard)] Yes, that is the figure I have here too.

[MacGregor] Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Yes, I would like to comment on that. Of course, in the structure of the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, there are some dissimilarities so to say and there are some imbalances. Of course, it is right that the Warsaw Pact has more tanks than NATO, but on the other hand the NATO forces have more tactical aviation that is capable of delivering nuclear weapons. So, it is only two examples of the disparities here and we are for eliminating such imbalance during the process of reduction of conventional weapons.

[MacGregor] I am sure many people will be very happy to hear that Mr Karpov, but that is of course another forum that Geneva, and perhaps for another time. Now, from (Lagas) in Portugal we move to Bulgaria, to Mr (Kristo Grozev). Mr (Grozev), your question, please, Mr (Grozev).

[(Grozev)] Good morning, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Good morning.

[(Grozev)] We know that in the presence of nuclear weapons, almost all kinds of conventional arms are fairly obsolete. So, suppose that the Soviet Union and the United States reach an agreement on dismantling all their nuclear weapons, won't the world be left dependent on the other countries with nuclear potential, for example, Israel or China or Pakistan? We have indications about their potentials.

[Karpov] There is such a problem, of course. (?If you) guarantee that when the nuclear disarmament is carried through by major powers -- the five nuclear powers -- there is no adherence of additional nuclear powers, and of course this problem needs some further studies and some further agreement which already goes out of the sphere of five nuclear powers and should be dealt with with the participation of other states as well.

[MacGregor] Mr (Grozev) in Bulgaria, would you like to come back to Mr Karpov on that?

[[Grozev]] Yes. My only question was will there be coordination and he answered that. Thank you.

[MacGregor] But I think there is a fear, Mr Karpov, of course that even should agreement be reached on intermediate and even the other ranges of nuclear weaponry in Europe and around the world, there will still be countries in the Third World that have a capability to fire nuclear weapons. What can one do about that?

[Karpov] I think there is already some good practice and good experience in the International Atomic Energy Agency which, I think, proved a rather efficient institution, and I think the improvement of that institution and give it more power and more possibilities to investigate and more 'glasnost' if you prefer this word...

[MacGregor] More openness...

[Karpov] Openness in this region of problems. I think it would help to overcome the suspicion that some other countries may appear as nuclear powers while the five nuclear powers are eliminating their nuclear weapons.

[MacGregor] And of course if they won't stick to the protocol, and they won't sign the nonproliferation treaty this is the problem.

[Karpov] Yes, of course, and I think we should work for improving the procedures of the nonproliferation process.

[MacGregor] Mr (Grozev) in Bulgaria, we thank you again for your question. We now move to Luxembourg, here in Western Europe. And Mr (Neil Finn), you have a question for Mr Karpov?

[[Finn]] Good afternoon, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Good afternoon.

[[Finn]] Mr Karpov, my question is: If in achieving a zero solution in Europe, medium-range missiles are transferred to Central and Eastern USSR, is there not a danger of another zone of confrontation across the North Pacific?

[Karpov] But, in fact we do not suggest that these missiles should be moved there. We suggest that all medium-range missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe be destructed or dismantled in a way that is guaranteed that they cannot be moved anywhere and used as weapons.

[MacGregor] But there is an intermediate agreement on the table, is there not, to keep 100 warheads east of the Urals?

[Karpov] Yes, it is there in the draft treaty presented both by the United States and the Soviet Union, in fact. Here, we agreed at Reykjavik that the United States will have the right to keep 100 weapons on their missiles, medium-range missiles, on its national territory, and the Soviet Union will keep 100 weapons on its medium-range missiles in its Asian part. And we agreed, in fact, to have control over these missiles that will be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States. So, there shouldn't be any possibility for both countries to violate the level of 100 weapons on missiles.

[MacGregor]: Mr (Finn) in Luxembourg?

[Finn] Yes, that doesn't stop great power rivalry in the region, and it is a fairly explosive region with the China-Soviet confrontation and also with the growing influence in Micronesia of the USSR. So, is there still not a risk of having any missiles in this area?

[Karpov] You see, we are for elimination of all nuclear weapons anywhere. In fact, we are for elimination of the rest of the medium-range missiles in Europe that will be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union for the time being. But we should work for that in a wider context of Asian problems. There are American bases, there are American missiles, for instance tactical missiles being now installed in South Korea with all the launch sites and necessary facilities being built there. The Americans are building a huge airbase in Misawa, in northern Japan, which will be a base for F-16's -- the nuclear-delivery planes -- and so why we should not have that in mind and have special talks on the possibilities of reducing the nuclear risks there having in mind these factors as well?

[MacGregor] So you are saying the focus of attention will shift after an agreement in Europe?

[Karpov] Oh yes, I think so.

[MacGregor] Mr (Finn), thank you for your question from Luxembourg. We now move to Kendle in Cumbria, here in Great Britain. Mr (Edward Stanton) is on the line. Mr (Stanton), your question please.

[(Stanton)] Oh, greetings to you Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] How do you do?

[(Stanton)] I am very pleased to be able to speak to you today.

May I ask you, Mr Karpov, would you agree that our world would be a safer place to live in if both East and West were to substantially cut down on weapons of mass destruction, and at the same time direct more money and effort into peace-building activities?

[Karpov] Yes, I agree completely with you. That's our goal, to convert the present world where competition in arms building, arms race, is one of the main trends into a world of peaceful cooperation for development of economy and interrelationship -- peaceful interrelationship -- between all countries of the world.

[MacGregor] Is it not so, Mr Karpov, though that it is essential for the Soviet Union's internal economy that some sort of arms agreement is reached because, it is said by outsiders, you simply cannot afford to go on putting money into the nuclear arms race?

[Karpov] You see, of course, we are not interested in wasting our money on arms race, and we would prefer to have that money introduced into the economy that will make the level of life in the Soviet Union much higher.

[MacGregor] One final question, Mr Karpov, if I may ask you, because the line to Kendle in Cumbria was not very good, as you could hear. You have yourself been sitting opposite Americans over the table for 20 or so years. Very little has been achieved in terms of -- in fact, one could say nothing has been achieved -- in terms of reducing the nuclear stockpile in the world. What are your hopes that something will be, quite shortly?

[Karpov] You see, I would say that there was a chance to reduce nuclear stockpiles in 1979 when the SALT II agreement was reached but was not ratified by the United States. We hope that the medium-range missiles in Europe agreement can be a practical step in that direction to reduce the nuclear stockpiles. It would be, maybe, not a wide range reduction but it will be a real reduction in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that might be a practical step to other measures that will further reduce Soviet and American nuclear potentials and later on to lead to agreement between all nuclear powers to reduce their weapons and eliminate them.

[MacGregor] Mr Viktor Karpov in Moscow, we thank you for joining us today. To everyone who called in, we thank you too from "It's Your World" between London, Moscow, and the rest of the world. From us today, goodbye.

UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST AT SEMIPALATINSK

LD060502 Moscow TASS in English 0500 GMT 6 Jun 87

["TASS Report -- Underground Nuclear Explosion" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow June 6 TASS -- An underground nuclear explosion with a capacity under 20 kilotons was conducted in the USSR at a test site near Semipalatinsk at 06.04, Moscow time, on June 6, 1987.

The explosion was conducted with the aim to check the results of research in the sphere of physics of nuclear explosion.

PRAVDA REPORTS BERLIN PACT MEETING DINNER SPEECHES

PMO31125 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 May 87 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "In An Atmosphere of Fraternal Friendship and Cordiality"]

[Text] Berlin, 29 May -- E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, gave a dinner today in honor of the participants in the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee conference.

The following were present: the Bulgarian delegation headed by T. Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council; the Hungarian delegation headed by J. Kadar, general secretary of the MSZMP; the GDR delegation headed by E. Honecker; the Polish delegation headed by W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and chairman of the Polish State Council; the Romanian delegation headed by N. Ceausescu, general secretary of the RCP and president of Romania; the USSR delegation headed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and the CSSR delegation headed by G. Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and president of the CSSR.

GDR party and state figures were also present.

E. Honecker addressed the gathering. Acting from a sense of responsibility for safeguarding peace, he said, we have conducted a broad and intensive exchange of opinions on the crucial questions of our time -- averting nuclear catastrophe and ensuring the basic conditions for the existence of all mankind. Our conference and its results give fresh impetus to the broad struggle to eliminate the threat of war and ensure a peaceful future. The indissoluble unity of socialism and peace has been convincingly demonstrated anew here. Thus the whole world public was again shown the humanist character of socialist policy, which was begun 70 years ago by the Great October Socialist Revolution's victory. It is a worthy contribution to the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution which we are celebrating this year as a common festival.

We attach main attention to eliminating medium-range missiles and all nuclear weapons, first and foremost in Europe, which is the common home of all Europeans, the GDR leader continued. The signing of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe would be a first and important step toward freeing our continent of all the means of mass destruction.

Of course, those imperialist forces which dislike the thrust of all this have not abandoned their policy of confrontation, the arms race, and the pursuit of military superiority. We will continue to need our allied states' vigorous and constructive policy of peace, the growing might of socialism, and cooperation with all peace-loving forces to ensure that reason and realism ultimately prevail in international affairs.

Our most important goal is a non-nuclear world and peace in space. The Warsaw Pact states do not claim greater security for themselves than others have, but neither will they accept reduced security.

Our conference, E. Honecker stressed, has demonstrated the complete unity and cohesion of our alliance. Paths and directions toward the further deepening and improvement of cooperation among our parties and states in all spheres of social life have been outlined.

W. Jaruzelski spoke on behalf of the fraternal countries' delegations. The Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Conference was held in a spirit of responsibility for the peaceful future of Europe and the whole world, unity and cohesion, and mutual respect and trust, he said. The conference fully confirmed that the general political line of our parties and states is correct and that the coordination of their actions in the international arena is effective. We expressed once more our resolute will to strengthen the Warsaw Pact, our alliance, which guarantees our people's lasting security.

The present conference is a new step toward ensuring a durable and just peace, equal security for all states, constructive cooperation, and a fair regional and world economic order, W. Jaruzelski noted. Our peace initiatives are concrete, comprehensive, and open in character. They complement one another by linking national and regional priorities with the alliance's interests as a whole. The Soviet initiative on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe is especially relevant and significant. An agreement on this question would be a real breakthrough in the process of ending the arms race and would open the way to lasting peace in Europe. That is also the aim of other initiatives put forward by the socialist countries.

The epoch-making historical transformations brought about in mankind's history by the Great October Revolution have had a fundamental influence on the destinies of hundreds of millions of people. Socialism has entered a period of great and fundamental changes which will determine its real place in the political, social, and economic life of the world on the eve of the new millennium. Our social system's vast spiritual forces and human and material reserves and our parties' reliable Leninist compass give us the confidence that socialism will meet the demands of history and will always be a symbol of peace, justice, and progress for all mankind.

The dinner took place in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship and cordiality.

KULIKOV TO COMMAND STAFF EXERCISE IN HUNGARY

LD051640 Budapest MTI in English 1522 GMT 5 May 87

[Text] Budapest, June 5 (MTI) -- According to the annual training schedule of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, a commander and staff command exercise is to be held in Hungary from June 12 to 18 by the selected staffs of the Hungarian People's Army and the Soviet Army. Viktor Kulikov, marshal of the Soviet Union and commander-in-chief of the united armed forces, will be in charge of the exercise, with Lieutenant General Lajos Morocz, under-secretary of state at the defence ministry, as his deputy.

Commander and staff command exercises are aimed at the joint preparation of commanders and staffs to gain adequate practice, improve cooperation and intensify brotherhood in arms. In addition to the staffs, only minor military units participate to ensure telecommunication and traffic control.

WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

LD071758 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 7 Jun 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Boris Andrianov, All-Union Radio commentator; Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM's editorial board, Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov, international observer for KOMMUNIST]

[Text] [Andrianov] Hello, comrades. Taking part in our roundtable meeting today are: Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial board of the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM, and Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov, international observer of the journal KOMMUNIST.

Nearly 1 and 1/2 weeks have passed since the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the participant states of the Warsaw Pact in Berlin, but the documents summing up its results continue to attract the attention of the broadest circles of the world public. That is not surprising. After all, every meeting of the leaders of the seven countries of this defensive alliance is an event of great international significance, and this is especially true of the recent conference in the capital of the German Democratic Republic, which proposed an extensive new program of measures aimed at normalizing the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole. That is a very timely initiative indeed; and one, moreover, that has been undertaken at a moment crucial in the highest degree in the development of international relations. There is every indication that the next month or two will decide whether this year will have been the year of the birth of major compromises, not only on the limitation but on the elimination of a considerable part of the nuclear armories of the Soviet Union and the United States. From this point of view, the meeting in Berlin is seen as one more link in the chain of the consistent efforts of the Soviet Union and of the other participants of the Warsaw Pact to lay a practical foundation for moving towards a world with a smaller quantity of arms and greater security.

The members of our defensive alliance are proving by word and deed that the socialist countries are advocates, not of some sort of cosmetic improvements in international relations, but of renewing them on the basis of recognizing the priority of values common to all mankind. Our fraternal states consider that there is now a greater real possibility than ever before of achieving major accords and agreements; but will this opportunity be seized -- or shall we find that we have let it slip by? It's a question the West must answer by its practical actions.

[Nekrasov] I must say the reactions in the West to the results of the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee make a curious impression. The Western world -- by which I mean the political and public figures, the media and all who have commented on the publication of the results of the conference and on its documents -- has clearly been split into two diametrically opposed camps.

On the one hand, we hear remarks and opinions indicating a desire to come to grips seriously with the content of the Berlin documents and view them in the same context as the other peace-loving initiatives of our country and of the other countries of socialism that the world has recently been witnessing. Thus there is clearly apparent a wish to draw the appropriate practical and positive conclusions from the initiative of the socialist countries. They are calling the results of the Berlin meeting innovative, and saying that they merit the closest attention and study.

In the opinion of West German Foreign Minister Genscher, for example, quoted by KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER, the East and West have now -- I quote -- entered a phase in the course of which both sides have come closer to the moment when a businesslike dialogue will begin. The minister had in mind a dialogue on a wide range of issues, including both arms reduction and the problem of providing for international security in general.

But, on the other hand, many organs of the news media in the West, and some politicians too, have been in a hurry to pretend that the conference in Berlin has been a transitory episode in international life; that it was held, and passed, and contributed nothing much. Also in West Germany, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner has said that the conference of the Political Consultative Committee was, as he expressed it, completely unsensational. Much of the right-wing press has tried to pretend, almost on the day after, that it's as if no such conference had taken place at all.

[Volskiy] Vadim Nikolayevich, it is interesting how they have tried to explain these attempts they've been making to belittle the significance of the ideas and proposals approved at the conference in Berlin. After all, in view of the present worldwide interest in the policy of our country and of the whole socialist community, they have had to justify that position in some way or other.

[Nekrasov] Yes, that's quite right. The necessary maneuver has been carried out. Evidently it was thought up in advance and duly prepared, but I must say that it's essentially a pretty elementary maneuver. Thus on the eve of the Berlin meeting, the Western mass media, obviously not without the knowledge of the propaganda services of NATO, put out the rumor that the conference of the Political Consultative Committee was expected to bring some serious new concessions on the part of the socialist countries. Well, what concessions could these have been? The grounds for prognostications of this kind were precisely nil. As you know, last year the participant states of the Warsaw Pact put forward integrated, comprehensively based proposals for reducing arms and armed forces in Europe. We have still not received anything similar to an intelligible answer from NATO to these radical proposals. We are still waiting for an answer from the camp of the North Atlantic Alliance, which it seems they cannot yet provide: They cannot agree on it in such a hurry. Therefore the rumor of some expected concession -- in other words, unilateral steps by the Warsaw Pact -- on examination turns out to be an obvious provocation by the Western special services. That provocation was necessary, so they could declare as soon as the conference was over that the steps expected of the Warsaw Pact countries had not been announced and that consequently the Berlin meeting had resulted in nothing new.

Behind this approach, one can discern a perfectly definite desire to distract the attention of the public of Western Europe from the proposal voiced in Berlin: A proposal which has been assessed by the progressive section of the Western public and the progressive press as very interesting and alluring. This is the proposal to hold a meeting of representatives of the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO to discuss the military doctrines of the two alliances. Militarist circles in Washington and in the other NATO countries are clearly afraid that this proposal will win public support and that it will be difficult to dismiss it. That is why they are rushing to slam the door shut at once.

Literally the day after publication of the military doctrine document of the Warsaw Pact member states, a U.S. newspaper, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE carried a dispatch from Brussels stating that NATO headquarters had rejected the call by the Warsaw Pact to hold joint consultations on military strategy. The correspondent of that U.S. paper made no secret of the fact that the NATO representatives were 'wary' of taking part in such talks.

[Andrianov] You mentioned, Vadim Nikolayevich, the critical statement by the West German defense minister, Woerner, concerning the Berlin conference. But here he is in the 1 June issue of the Hamburg paper DIE WELT, saying in an interview that the East's proposal to talk about military doctrines is in accord with NATO's conceptions. This is exactly what our alliance has demanded, says Woerner. So evidently the North Atlantic Alliance is not fully unanimous on this question.

[Nekrasov] Yes, possibly there really isn't any unanimity in the tactical sense -- you're right about that. They don't know in what form they should react. As I've said, it's a proposal capable of capturing the minds of millions of people. It follows incontrovertibly from the Berlin document that the military doctrine of the socialist countries is peaceful and defensive. Now the NATO countries are being invited to collate with the countries of the Warsaw Pact their views on nuclear war and find ways of reaching agreement to reduce the military balance to the lowest level possible -- to what is termed the level of rational defensive sufficiency [razumnaya oboronitelnaya dostatochnost], and no more.

If such a collation of military doctrines were carried out today, what would it show? First of all, it would reveal the aggressiveness of the military plans of the NATO leaders, and their threatening character regarding the very future of the European Continent. That threat is contained in their pronounced unwillingness to denounce first use of nuclear weapons.

[Andrianov] So you assume that the leadership of the NATO countries will try to avoid the proposed meeting with representatives of the countries of the Warsaw Pact to collate military doctrines. Do you think they will succeed in this?

[Nekrasov] Well, I think it's too soon to make predictions about that. All you can say is that these circles will be under very strong pressure. The leadership of the socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact members, have, as you know, expressed approval of the proposals adopted in Berlin. Whether the West likes it or not, the pressure from sober-minded politicians, whole political parties and public organizations advocating detente, this pressure in favor of accepting the proposal of the socialist countries will continue and will undoubtedly become more intense.

[Andrianov] Of course there is no need to dispute that between states, just as between social movements on our planet, there are contradictions, there exist disagreements and divergencies of opinion. Various groups of people in our international community have differing interests. Yet the task of human survival rises above all this. That is the argument on which the new political thinking is based, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasized at his meeting this week with representatives of the movement International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War.

Our country builds its policy on the foundation of the new thinking. This is confirmed by the major initiatives and actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership in the past 2 years with the aim of lowering international tension and creating an atmosphere of trust, mitigating the nuclear danger, eliminating chemical weapons, reducing conventional arms and armed forces and making the military doctrines exclusively defensive in character. No one can accuse our country of lacking reserves of goodwill. Our proposal on medium-range missiles is vivid proof of that. It is truly unique in its significance. Consider that for decades nothing has been done to reduce nuclear weapons, and our proposal, if implemented, would be a real step toward beginning the process of nuclear disarmament. On top of that it would be of enormous practical, political and, of course, psychological significance.

[Volskiy] We talk a lot today about European affairs, and of course they are very important, but in general the situation in Europe is relatively calm -- unlike, for instance, a region such as the Persian Gulf, where there has recently been a sharp increase in the tension that is itself superimposed upon the Iran-Iraq war, now in its 7th year. I won't repeat the facts, I'll just touch on a few aspects of the situation.

The official pretext for the buildup of the U.S. Fleet at the approaches to the Gulf and in the Gulf itself is the recent incident in which an Iraqi plane fired on a U.S. warship -- regarded, officially, as an accident. But, you know, it's also obvious that preparations for the buildup of U.S. forces in the Gulf were being made long before. Actually, the U.S. military infrastructure in the region was being created throughout all the years of the Iran-Iraq war. It was during that period, let me remind you, that aircraft equipped with the AWACS early-warning system were deployed in Saudi Arabia, enabling the entire Gulf zone to be kept under surveillance. Then the U.S. Central Command was set up, with a sphere of operations extending to that region.

Very recent events also show the present concentration of U.S. forces is no spontaneous phenomenon. As it happens, major NATO maneuvers are presently starting in eastern Anatolia, in Turkey -- a stone's throw from the Gulf. More than that, the United States is trying to draw its NATO allies into operations in the Gulf. This extension of the zone of operation of the North Atlantic bloc to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East amounts to a violation of the equilibrium that has become established in the world -- a violation of the balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO; and this, naturally, makes the situation unpredictable and gives rise to the possibility of very dangerous consequences, especially if you bear in mind that what is afoot is a plan to set up -- according to the U.S. press -- a multinational NATO force of some kind in the Persian Gulf.

[Nekrasov] One may recall, Dmitriy Antonovich, that multinational force has once been sent from the West to the Near East: to Lebanon, in 1982, only to be ingloriously evacuated later, after suffering very severe losses. In proportion to the scale of the force, naturally.

[Volskiy] Well, as you remember, they were landed there not independently, but in the wake of the Israeli interventionists, who had invaded Lebanon. The fifth anniversary of the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 has just been marked. Another ominous date, so to speak, is the 20th anniversary of the Six Day war of 1967, when Israel attacked Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

This, of course, is a unique anniversary, if you will permit the expression, but an instructive one as well. Instructive, first and foremost, because it allows one to reach an indisputable conclusion: Attempts at solving the problems of the Near East by means of force and aggression lead nowhere. Indeed, have Israel and its U.S. sponsors achieved any of their objectives since the June 1967 war? In essence, they have achieved nothing in the Near East, except the creation of permanent tension in that area and the growth of, let us say, extremist tendencies there -- for example, Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism.

Or take the following fact: Contrary to the expectations of both the Americans and their Israeli partners, since as-Sadat not a single Arab leader has yet brought himself to take the road of Camp David and separate deals -- even those who figure among America's friends.

And in Lebanon, the Israeli invasion and the landing of NATO forces there, if they led to any changes in internal forces, then it was not to the advantage of pro-Western circles. In this connection, it would seem everything indicates how very essential it is -- life itself points toward this, so to speak -- to take measures to reach a political settlement of the Near East conflict and to end the Iran-Iraq war. All this can only be done on the basis of reason, on the basis of peaceful political means.

[Nekrasov] You mentioned the internal clashes in Lebanon, which are caused, in particular, by religious quarrels. But India, a far larger developing country, is at the moment also experiencing similar internal difficulties -- and moreover, of an extremely serious nature. The Indian leadership is now speaking increasingly frequently about the fact that external forces are interfering in, and exerting an influence on, the events taking place there.

[Volskiy] But I think, Vadim Nikolayevich, that it is, all the same, difficult to draw direct comparisons between enormous India and little Lebanon. But since we're on the subject of the situation in India, which is indeed characterized by a strengthening of religious-communal clashes, I would like to dwell on the following points. First, the fact that these clashes are a distinctive kind of reaction to the rapid and fairly stormy and contradictory social and political development of India over the past few years. You know India has become one of the top 10 countries regarding volume of industrial output, that a program of computerizing the economy is being implemented there, and that India has already broken through into outer space, but the traditional social structures of Indian society are, naturally, not adapted to that process, to the rapid development of capitalism. This, on the whole, is the source of the present events, of course: People who are unable to find a place for themselves in the new structure begin to place particular trust in the customary forms of life, take the passing of these latter into the past badly, and look for a sort of safety-valve in hostility toward representatives of other religions. But that is just one side of the story; the other, which in my view is more dangerous, is the fact that all this is being exploited by those opposed to the strengthening of an independent and nonaligned India, by those who do not want to see a growth of India's influence in the world. The Indian press and politicians used to avoid specifically naming these opponents and talked in a somewhat abstract way about external forces. Now, however, more and more frequently, things are being spelled out; they point directly toward the United States as the forces behind the scenes of the present religious-communal quarrels -- if not the cause of the quarrels themselves, then at least of their exacerbation.

[Nekrasov] I think we can state that at the moment it is precisely in Asia that most of the regional conflicts which pose a threat to peace are taking place, ranging from the Near East and the Persian Gulf, which we discussed earlier, to the situation around Cambodia and in the Korean Peninsula.

[Volskiy] Yes, and this points to the fact that at the moment Asia is in particular need of a stabilization of the situation perhaps, or a normalization of the atmosphere. In this respect, a very important and positive role is being played, of course, by Soviet-Indian relations, this new stage is typified by a spirit of trust and profound mutual understanding, demonstrated once again at the 4 June meeting between Comrade Gorbachev and Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs Tiwari on 4 June. It goes without saying that cooperation with India is not an isolated stand of Soviet foreign policy; it is connected with the USSR's overall course of reinforcing security in Asia and in the ocean basins washing its shores. In this connection, I think it would be worthwhile dwelling in greater detail on the situation in the Asia-Pacific Ocean region, and especially on what is happening around Fiji.

[Andrianov] At the very beginning of last week, the world community once again turned its attention to the events which took place in Fiji on 14 May. I'm referring to the coup d'etat carried out there by soldiers led by Lieutenant Colonel Rabuka. The situation which has arisen in that small island state located in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean was the subject of a lively discussion lasting 10 hours at the recently-ended session of the South Pacific Forum. Let me remind you that the forum is a regional political and economic organization which brings together 15 states and self-governing territories located in that area of our planet -- one of these being Fiji. Fiji's representatives were not present at the forum session, and therefore, following the heated debate, the session's participants decided to dispatch their own delegation to that country with instructions to investigate the post-coup situation there and establish what assistance is needed to settle the political and economic crisis.

[Nemrasov] But a question mark still hangs over whether that special delegation will go to Fiji. The thing is that Ganilau, the governor general, who represents the British Queen in that country -- that is the supreme state authority, so to speak -- has refused to accept the mission of the Pacific Forum, stating that there is no need for it to come. Incidentally, one is struck by the contradictory behavior by this representative of the British Crown in Fiji: At the beginning, following the coup, he did not want to recognize the government set up by the rebels, but a little later, he promoted the mutineers' ringleader, Rabuka, raising him to the rank of colonel.

[Volskiy] It is thought that this inconsistency to put it mildly, shows the position of London itself. It is quite possible that initially Ganilau knew nothing and had no information about the preparations for the coup, and only subsequently received some kind of instructions, or perhaps hints, from the British capital, which he, evidently, is not adverse to following. But at the same time, one cannot rule out the possibility that everything is more straightforward -- perhaps it is simply a game, a game with shared roles, so to speak, at which British politicians are past masters.

[Andrianov] As they say, other options are also possible, especially since certain circles in the West have sought to surround events in Fiji with as dense a fog as possible. A propaganda canard has even appeared about the hand of Moscow. The rumors about this, as one Australian television company has reported, have been intensively propagated in Fiji's capital, Suva. Their gist is the coup d'etat was effected allegedly with the aim of preventing the Russians from strengthening their influence on the Bavadra government. It came to power legally, following the election which were held on Fiji on 12 April this year.

To be fair, it is in order to say that the premier himself, Timoci Bavadra, expounding the foreign policy platforms of his cabinet, openly stated that he had no intention of opening a Soviet embassy in the country. I think such a statement requires no explanation as proof of the groundlessness of anti-Soviet reasons for the coup on Fiji.

[Volskiy] I once came across the comment of an Indonesian newspaper which is fairly widespread in Asia, the newspaper MERDEKA. It forthrightly described the former prime minister, Kara, and Rabuka, as trustees of the West in the Pacific region. Maybe, such a description really does shed some light on the reasons for the coup d'etat on Fiji?

[Andrianov] That is more than reasonable view. After all when the Mara government was in power on Fiji, it permitted U.S. ships with nuclear weapons to enter the ports of its country.

But the new Bavadra cabinet promised to put an end to this practice. Moreover, in preparing to proclaim the nonnuclear status of its state, the Bavadra government advocated Fiji becoming a member of the Nonaligned Movement, and had started to develop economic relations with socialist countries.

[Nekrasov] Well, it is clear they had no desire to come to terms with this in Washington. (Kenneth Douglas), general secretary of the New Zealand Federation of Labor, believes, for example, the events on Fiji were inspired by the United States. In the view of the experts of the organization of New Zealand peace supporters, the preparation for the revolt began immediately following the victory which the party of the left had gained in the April elections.

Mara, the former prime minister, who had acquired the reputation of a resolute supporter of a U.S. military presence in the South Pacific, paid a visit to the United States a short while before the revolt. Shortly thereafter, a sizeable number of U.S. servicemen arrived on Fiji in the guise of personnel of the notorious Peace Corps. After all, it is no secret that this organization has on many occasions been used by Washington for subversive activities abroad. Two weeks prior to the coup, the present U.S. representative at the United Nations, Vernon Walters, once leader of secret CIA operations, paid a call on Fiji. Thus this present diplomat, who is better known to the world as an inveterate intelligence officer, and a major specialist on toppling regimes which do not suit Washington, clearly appeared on Fiji at the right moment.

[Volskiy] At present, the U.S. Administration and the secret services in the United States are disavowing participation in the events on Fiji. But how do their arguments ring? In my view, unconvincing. According to information of the newspaper AKAHATA -- this is an informed organ of the Japanese Press -- the coup was directly managed by a group consisting of five staff members of the CIA. One of these was even in the parliament building, where the rebels arrested the legal government. Precisely 1 month prior to the military coup, AKAHATA wrote that the rapid spread of antinuclear attitudes in the South Pacific was irritating Washington, where hints as to the possibility of punitive measures against Fiji had already been made, so that someone else's hand -- a hand which finds the sovereign and antinuclear foreign policy course of small states in the South Pacific not to its liking -- may be perceived in the events in this country.

[Andrianov] Official Washington literally gives a hostile reception to everything not suiting it. Thus, a fresh example -- the U.S. Administration received the law, adopted by the parliament of New Zealand and proclaiming the country a nuclear-free zone, with barely concealed malice. This prohibits nuclear weapons from being deployed [razmeshchat] on its territory, and naval vessels carrying such weapons on board or operating on nuclear fuel from entering its ports. The official representative of the U.S. State Department, Charles Redman, announced 3 days ago that this law was incompatible with the global policy of the United States, and, in the process accused New Zealand of steering a course aimed against the West and disrupting -- what would you think -- the efforts to maintain peace.

This is how accustomed they have grown in Washington to turning inside out antinuclear and antiwar actions which prevent U.S. geo-politicians from implementing their course which poses a danger for other countries and peoples. However, it is time for the people across the ocean to understand how ideas on human destiny have changed in our lifetime for millions and millions of people on the earth. They live in the hope that persistent efforts with the aim of radical reduction in, and the complete elimination of, nuclear weapons will ultimately bear positive results.

On this, we shall end our meeting at the roundtable. All participants in this thank you for your attention, esteemed comrade-listeners. Goodbye and all the best to you.

MOSCOW TV ON GOAL OF UPCOMING VENICE SUMMIT

LD072059 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 7 Jun 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; correspondents Yu. Vybornov and Valentin Zorin, identified by screen captions, report from Venice]

[Excerpts] [Vybornov] The meeting of the heads of states and governments of seven leading capitalist countries: the United States, Britain, France, Japan, Italy, the FRG and Canada opens here tomorrow. [passage omitted]

[Zorin] Significant events will begin in this building tomorrow. It is here that the leaders of the seven leading capitalist states will, in the course of the next 3 days, be holding their conference. Well, usually these annual, traditional meetings are of a more or less routine character. This is not the case this time, not merely because important economic and some other problems will be examined, but above all because the leaders of the Western countries have set themselves the goal of working out a joint reply to the Soviet disarmament proposals and, first and foremost, to the medium-range missiles proposals. Perhaps it will be no exaggeration if I say that the success of the Geneva conference depends to a significant extent on whether the meeting's participants succeed in finding a joint formula or whether they will not be able to manage to do this.

If one is to take a broader look at things, the future course of the political process in today's world depends a lot on whether a healthy approach is to be manifested here, or whether the ancient Venice becomes the place where examples of old thinking are demonstrated.

Several thousand Western journalists who have now descended on Venice are currently excelling in all manner of forecasts. We shall not follow their example and chase sensational predictions: We shall wait to see how events develop and will tell our television viewers about them without fail.

REAGAN IN VENICE TO CONFER WITH BIG SEVEN LEADERS

Reagan Worldnet Speech

LD052116 Moscow TASS in English 2024 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Text] Washington June 5 TASS -- President Reagan staying in Venice in connection with the coming conference of the leaders of seven capitalist countries spoke over the radio and channels of Worldnet. He said that his speech is addressed especially to the young people of Europe.

What is it that, in Reagan's opinion, the world will see in the 21st century? First of all, according to Reagan, the "Strategic Defence Initiative," also known as the "Star Wars" which Reagan, as usual, tried to present as "defensive weapons" allegedly called upon to make nuclear weapons "forever obsolete."

Touching upon the Soviet-American negotiations on medium-range missiles in Europe, the President said that the treaty on the area would not be the end, but the beginning of the arms reduction effort. Making assurances that the United States is striving for strategic arms reduction, Reagan demanded in the same breath that West European countries, jointly with the United States, should step up their military preparations.

Reagan's call to the Soviet Union: "Leave your weapons at home," "dismantle your weapons pointed at Europe," clearly had a wrong address. This call was made at the very moment when the Pentagon officially confirmed reports that it sends to the Persian Gulf via the Mediterranean a U.S. Naval force led by the aircraft carrier Saratoga. Somewhat earlier Reagan declared for keeping in the territory of Western Europe 72 "Pershing-A" missiles adopted for service by the FRG Bundeswehr. And the nuclear warheads to fit out those missiles belong to the USA.

Reagan spoke enthusiastically about economic and political prospects which, as he asserted, open to capitalist countries in the 21st century. But he passed in silence most acute problems facing those countries now. It is in order to try solve those problems that the leaders of seven countries gather in Venice.

Reagan Preview of Topics

LD062336 Moscow TASS in English 2242 GMT 6 Jun 87

[Text] Washington, June 6 TASS -- The problems of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will be an important item on the agenda of the summit meeting of the seven major capitalist countries opening in Venice, U.S. President Reagan said in his latest Saturday radio address to the nation.

He pointed out that Soviet-American talks on arms cuts had reached now a critical stage. However, Reagan said that the United States intended to reaffirm its commitment to strong defence. According to the President, the meeting in Venice will cover trade differences between the Western countries, problems of terrorism, drug addiction and the AIDS epidemic.

Reagan Talk With John Paul II

PM071631 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "R. Reagan at the Vatican"]

[Text] Rome June 6 TASS -- Today Pope John Paul II received U.S. President Ronald Reagan and had a talk with him, on the eve of the pope's visit to Poland.

According to a report by the Vatican's official spokesman, the eye-to-eye meeting covered burning topical issues.

Ronald Reagan promised the pope to pray for the success (in his own terms, naturally) of his trip.

Ovchinnikov on 'Selfish Ends'

LD072038 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 7 Jun 87

[From "The International Panorama" program presented by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov]

[Text] In continuing the conversation on the forthcoming meeting of the Seven, it has to be noted that the periodic summit consultations have attracted the allies as a chance to influence Washington, taking account of the new correlation of forces. But the U.S. Administration looks on the meeting of the Big Seven as a lever to foist its will on the partners, to remove discussion unfavorable to the United States on currency and financial problems to the background, and to lay special stress on solidarity by the allies under the slogans of anti-Sovietism and neoglobalism.

At last year's meeting of the Big Seven in Tokyo, Reagan insisted that his interlocutors approve the U.S. raids in Libya. In Venice, by all accounts, he will demand more from the allies, to have them become accomplices to the U.S. venture in the Persian Gulf. If, the argument runs, West Europe and Japan are 10 times more dependent than the United States on Middle East oil, then they should protect freedom of navigation there, following the example of the United States.

We have here a recurrence of the long-standing aspiration of Washington to extend NATO's sphere of operation to seats of tension beyond the bounds of Europe. The U.S. Administration clearly wants to use the mechanism of periodic consultations of the Big Seven for her own selfish ends, not in order to smooth over contradictions in the sphere of the economy as had originally been conceived, but in order to form a global anti-Soviet coalition, and in order to attach the allies to the U.S. policy of state terrorism and forceful pressure on the liberated countries.

The allies have received multinational forces in the Persian Gulf without enthusiasm, to put it mildly. For Japan, for example, even financial support for such actions would be a flagrant contradiction of the Constitution. And for the ruling circles of Britain, this is even less of a gift at the present time. A matter of days remain to the parliamentary elections which are to decide whether the Conservatives can manage to stay in power for a third term. [video shows Ovchinnikov to camera]

WEINBERGER SPEECH MADE TO 'PROMPT' REAGAN

LD052336 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1910 GMT 4 Jun 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Fesunenکو]

[Text] Almost simultaneously with Reagan's visit to the shores of the Old World, U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger delivered a speech in London dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Marshal Plan. This speech was conveyed in his traditional style. The Pentagon chief once again — as he did many times before — said that peace can be preserved only when the United States speaks the language of force when addressing the rest of the world. These are well-known motives and there is nothing new in these statements. But it is possible to notice a curious regularity. It is the first time that the American secretary of defense has practiced militaristic oratory just as the President is departing for important international talks. I can remember something like this happened when Reagan was setting off for the meetings with Comrade Gorbachev in Geneva and in Reykjavik. A question arises: Why is it that at these precise times Weinberger tries, in a way, to warn the President? It is as if, sitting in the prompter's box, he is supposed to suggest the words for the role that, from the viewpoint of Washington hawks, without fail must be bellicose and intransigent.

WICK OPENS U.S. INFORMATICS EXHIBIT IN MOSCOW

LD052244 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Jun 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] An exhibition opened today in the electrical equipment pavilion at the USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements in Moscow, entitled "Information Science in the Life of the United States." Correspondent Sturua reports:

[Sturua] The exhibition was arranged and is being held in accordance with the general agreement between the USSR and U.S. governments on contacts, exchanges and cooperation in the sphere of science, technology, education, culture, and other fields, for the years 1986-91, as well as the program of cooperation and exchanges for the years 1986-88. [video shows opening ceremonies, speakers at a microphone, newsmen recording scene; pictures, VDU's, television monitors, public inspecting exhibits]

The photographs and short video films presented at the exhibition relate how electronics are being utilized in the United States in industry, agriculture, management, and in the home. Some specimens of this equipment are also on display here.

Taking part in the opening ceremony was Charles Wick, director of the U.S Information Agency.

[Begin Wick in English fading into superimposed Russian translation] Throughout the world, including the United States, the energetic implementing of the initiatives of General Secretary Gorbachev is being followed with great interest. The very word glasnost contains great hopes for us all, as an easing of tension in the world, which we all need, will be a result of the policy of glasnost.

My meetings with officials in your country have demonstrated readiness to cooperate, and a high level of interest in such cooperation, which is fully in accord with our wish to move forward on such complex issues as exchanges of students, lecturers, teachers, artistes, exhibitions, and museum displays. I have had useful conversations with managers of the Soviet mass media, the newspapers and magazines. All this is in large measure part of your policy of glasnost.

President Reagan likes to repeat that peace and cooperation are achieved when people talk to one another, not when they appear as orators, with only one of them allowed to speak while the other may only listen. What we are endeavoring to do is converse with each other, and not simply express our own views.

In implementing these aims, numerous problems arise. The way to resolve them, in order to achieve greater mutual understanding, is to attain greater trust, agreement, and a wish to arrive at the goal by joint efforts. In this I have encountered the most eager response from Soviet officials. [end recording]

[Sturua] The American exhibition will be in Moscow until 8 July. After that the people of Kiev, Rostov on Don, Tbilisi, and Tashkent will be able to acquaint themselves with it.

A reciprocal Soviet exhibition will open on 25 August in New Orleans. It will bear the title, "USSR: Man, Family, and Society."

Holds Press Conference

LD052149 Moscow TASS in English 2132 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 5 TASS -- USIA Director Charles Wick said that he attended the ceremony of opening informatics in the USIA exhibition and that he was glad that it enjoyed popularity with Soviet people. Today he spoke at a press conference in the new building of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Foreign journalists and TASS correspondents were invited to it. The aim of the exhibition, the first travelling one since the U.S. exhibition in Moscow in 1959, is to show Muscovites what influence the evolution in information means has on the life of U.S. society.

In a week of his stay in Moscow, said Charles Wick, he had very serious and useful negotiations with many high-ranking officials, including a four-hour talk with Aleksandr Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He and his party were received everywhere warmly and with great attention. Speaking of the essence of negotiations, Charles Wick pointed out that he drew the firm conclusion that the improvement of bilateral relations between the two nations directly depended on expansion of academic, cultural and information contacts. The agreements reached in Geneva in 1985 make it incumbent on us to do this.

In Moscow, Charles Wick said, his colleagues and he were accorded the most sincere hospitality. They felt, the USIA director went on to say, that their Soviet counterparts exerted efforts so that they could tackle with success the difficult tasks for whose solution they had come to Moscow at this historic time in bilateral relations between the two countries

'Interview That Failed'

PM062019 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Shalnev article: "About an Interview That Failed: USIA Director Sidesteps Questions"]

[Text] The interview was not a success. The interviewee got up and left without even saying goodbye, saying as he went out of the door that he would complain about me "higher up." From his viewpoint my questions were unprofessional, they were intended to intimidate him, they were outrageous questions.

I was doing an interview -- not my first, by the way -- with a man who ought, it seemed, to be used to and prepared for any kind of question since propaganda and counterpropaganda, and of a very aggressive kind, are his trade. I was interviewing Mr Charles Wick, USIA director, who has been visiting Moscow this week. There were a lot of things I wanted him to clarify, straighten out, and explain. So, first, I asked what his impression was of the meetings he had at the CPSU Central Committee, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, the Ministry of Culture, and so forth. Our guest's impressions had been favorable. "The meetings went extremely well," he said. "The Soviet official representatives I met were very hospitable hosts and showed a desire to do everything possible to implement the agreement on exchanges -- an agreement signed during the Soviet-American summit in Geneva in November 1985." "I am more than satisfied with the meetings I have had," the USIA director stressed again.

True, I was somewhat worried by the fact that, when we got down to specifics, C. Wick did not talk about plans for developing cooperation between our countries in the sphere of culture but tried to confine himself to voicing complaints against the Soviet side because, for example, the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra had not been given the right number of hotel rooms when it toured our country. There is no denying that that was a most unpleasant, probably even a scandalous thing to happen, and that by letting it happen we made yet another hole in the notions about traditional Russian hospitality. Yet all the members of the orchestra were eventually accommodated. That is in the first place. Second, our cooperation is clearly not just a matter of problems and difficulties. There are successes, too, but C. Wick was saying nothing about them in the interview.

Then again, we could certainly do some complaining, too. I recall, for example, how 18 months ago President Reagan illustrated his vision of Soviet-American exchanges in the sphere of culture by saying that the United States could welcome the Bolshoy Ballet and send the Soviet Union the Beach Boys in return. While not wishing to offend rock music lovers, much less fans of that Californian group, I must nevertheless observe that such an "exchange" seems to me, at least, like exchanging black caviar for Boston mackerel. The question I asked C. Wick, whose agency is the main coordinator of contacts with the American side in the cultural sphere, began with the above quote and seemed to me a natural; one: Are the exchanges going to be equivalent?

Instead of answering, he essentially tried to cast doubt on the authenticity of the quote from the Reagan speech, showed quite considerable irritation that such a question had been asked at all, and gave a rejoinder which meant: If you in the Soviet Union cannot pay American performers the kind of fees that the Bolshoy Ballet receives in America, what do you expect us to do about it? "We are not in a position to give subsidies," Wick said.

I do not know the details of financial accounts, and I would be afraid to get involved in such details, not being a specialist. But I must confess surprise at the way the USIA director put it: The fees paid to the Beach Boys or any other popular rock group are fabulous and may even sometimes exceed the fees paid to a large classical orchestra. Isn't the USIA trying to toss us a little more of the kind of thing which you wouldn't call genuine art -- art that will be valued forever -- but which contains American spiritual values in a concentrated form? I am not trying to impose my own opinion of those values. By no means. People who like the Beach Boys are welcome to listen to them as much as they wish, all night long. But put them, even obliquely, on the level with the Bolshoy? Pardon me....

Anyway, after that question -- that one about equivalence -- our interview began to take on a certain inner tension, which splashed out into the open after we moved on, in the USIA director's words, to "general questions." C. Wick categorically refused to make any comment on public opinion poll results testifying to a rapid decline in Reagan's popularity in the international arena and decreasing confidence in the head of the White House among West Europeans, for example, I did not ask him the question by chance: Because it is Wick who is mainly responsible for ensuring the administration's popularity outside the United States. It seems to me, though, that Wick and the USIA have a hopeless task: It would be difficult to expect any other reaction from the West Europeans or the peoples of other countries in a situation in which, as the WASHINGTON POST emphasizes, Moscow is casting a spell over the world with the most varied proposals in different spheres while the American president is weakened by foreign policy scandals. (I would observe in parentheses that the paper expressed itself in sharper terms with respect to Reagan and that I have simply toned down what it said.)

The USIA director also gave a hostile reception to questions about his own recent speech in which he called the openness being practiced in the Soviet Union a threat to U.S. security. Again I was accused of seizing on statements out of context. Even though the context of Wick's entire speech had been openness and the problem of how the United States should counter it. The director's speech was remarkable for the following: For the first time the head of the foreign political propaganda agency effectively admitted that the activity of the USIA -- which incorporates VOA, incidentally -- is not producing the proper results, that the propaganda campaigns waged by the United States are being very seriously challenged, and that the challenge comes from openness.

Mr Wick's irritation increased when we moved on to a question of direct concern to us journalists: why Soviet reporters in the United States are being denied access to State Department premises and why they have had their State correspondent's tickets taken away. Why did I ask Wick in particular about that? Because he regularly takes part in the daily morning State Department leadership conferences and was thus a party, one way or another, to that decision. Here is the argument the USIA chief gave me: It is being done for security reasons, so that, as he put it, "people don't go" where they shouldn't. Wick suggested at my observation that, as he well knew, Soviet reporters could not go anywhere than the second floor of the State Department buildings, where the press office is located, without being stopped immediately.

The interview collapsed after I enquired -- we were talking about the exchange of motion pictures between our countries at the time -- whether he had seen the film "The Cry of the Dolphin" [Krik Delfina]. I asked, because Wick has commented very sharply on the film, calling it "exceptionally anti-American, and made in the same genre as films that you object to -- 'Rambo,' for example." The USIA director had not seen "The Cry of the Dolphin," but relied entirely, as he put it, on the opinion of those who have.

And he called my question -- I quote: "intimidatory, unprofessional, and outrageous." "I have gotten a most unpleasant impression from this interview. I'm sorry that I agreed to give it," he said, and he left, promising from the threshold that he would put in a complaint about me.

Before describing my own main impression of this interview, I quote a passage from a conversation that I and a colleague had with Wick 18 months ago in Washington. You, he said then, "are asking, in a very difficult situation, questions which are very complex and may even be aggressive. But they are a part of your job and a part of the job of our mass media correspondents. You are doing that job without offending individuals or promoting hostile sentiments."

So why has Wick now given in to irritation and allowed himself to do something that he rarely does -- to cut short an interview? I do not know the precise answer. But suffice it to recall once again what kind of questions the USIA director stumbled over and which ones provoked a stormy response in him to see how recently the Reagan administration's propaganda machine -- a gigantic, well-oiled machine -- has clearly not been coping with the task entrusted to it of ensuring the prestige of the White House and its boss. Wick is conscious of the fact, and that is why he is irritated....

And one last thing. About the promise to complain "higher up." Is the USIA director trying to pressure the Soviet press? Isn't his own press enough for him?

U.S. NAVY SHIPS HEAD FOR MEDITERRANEAN, GULF

LD071247 Moscow TASS in English 1214 GMT 7 Jun 87

[Text] New York June 7 TASS -- The U.S. guided missile frigate "Klakring" left the U.S. naval base in Charleston, South Carolina, on Saturday, heading for the Persian Gulf area where the United States continues to build up its military presence.

Another three combatant ships left Charleston for the Mediterranean at the same time.

The frigate "Bowen" which is being delayed by repair work will join them somewhat later.

There are a total of about 1,300 U.S. servicemen on board the ships.

All the ships are part of a naval force led by the aircraft carrier "Saratoga" which had set out on Friday for a six-month deployment in the Mediterranean.

FOREIGN MINISTRY'S IVANOV ON GULF, MIDEAST ISSUES

JN021520 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 1 Jun 87 p 19

[Interview with Aleksandr Ivanov, chief of the "Arab Gulf Section" in the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, by Muhammad Yunus in Moscow -- date not given]

[Text] [Yunus] From which angle is the Soviet Union viewing the Gulf now? How does it evaluate the current situation, whether in its waters or on its shores?

[Ivanov] In our opinion, the situation in the Gulf is very tense and threatens not only the region's states, but the freedom of international navigation and the security of all Gulf states. What recently happened regarding tankers and ships was a clear indication of the threat posed to navigation. The strike against the U.S. ship and the explosion of a mine under a Soviet tanker and other ships are provocative measures which increase tension in the Gulf by increasing the foreign countries' military presence.

[Yunus] Who is responsible then for inviting these fleets and is there a possibility for a collision?

[Ivanov] The United States is primarily responsible for this. The theory which Carter announced in 1979 is behind the presence of the U.S. fleet in the region. This theory was practically applied before the Iraq-Iran war began when the former U.S. President said the Gulf region falls within the circle of U.S. interests. This prompted the United States to send its troops to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf entrances. This theory is in itself a threat to peace in the region and the world.

Hence came Gorbachev's proposal in India to reduce the 6th Fleet and remove military bases in the region. It concerns me to emphasize in this regard that the Soviet Union has not sent its fleets to the region. It has only two ships there to protect tankers and not to maintain a military presence there, although the United States declares that the Gulf is a vital zone for it. Simply speaking, the continuation of war between Iraq and Iran is the main reason for the presence of foreign fleets in this region.

[Yunus] What, in your opinion, are the best ways to end the war?

[Ivanov] In our opinion, the war is a hotbed [of tension] and it is necessary to eliminate this hotbed. We believe the best way to end the war lies in holding peace talks between the two warring parties. But we must be realistic and say it is difficult under the present circumstances to hold direct talks, that is, to move from the trench to the table.

Therefore, the United Nations and the Security Council should play a special and distinguished role in this regard by issuing a resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal to international borders and then for talks leading to a peace treaty between Iraq and Iran. Naturally, the resolution should guarantee the freedom of navigation and safety of air, ground, and sea routes. The Security Council has the power to force the two sides to cease fire and has the means to protect security and navigation in the Gulf, even if circumstances dictate that UN forces be formed for this purpose. International efforts are now the best way to stop this bloodshed and this threat to navigation and world peace.

[Yunus] Will the Soviet Union sponsor such a call?

[Ivanov] At first we had doubts about the United States' intentions and these doubts were confirmed recently because the U.S. role in the Gulf is not innocent. The U.S. policy is two-faced as confirmed by the scandal of U.S. arms to Iran. The Soviet Union will continue its efforts at the Security Council, in addition to efforts by the Council's permanent member states, to issue a resolution like the one we just mentioned. We actually have suggested issuing a joint statement to this effect, but we have not yet reached a decisive result. Nevertheless, we will continue our efforts, because what we have achieved so far is encouraging.

[Yunus] Let us suppose for the sake of argument that a resolution was issued with the agreement of the five big powers and rejected by one of the two warring parties -- especially Iran, which still rejects all solutions, resolutions, and efforts to halt the war -- how would the Security Council deal with the Iranian rejection?

[Ivanov] If such a resolution were issued, it would express an international desire and will. The permanent members of the Security Council would act in accordance with the emerging circumstances. The Council would be authorized and empowered to implement its resolution, even with the use of force in accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter, by imposing sanctions and taking all measures against the side rejecting the resolution and forcing it to implement it.

[Yunus] Does Moscow think that there is some coordination between the United States and Iran, be it regarding the war or the threat to navigation in the Gulf?

[Ivanov] I cannot say there is U.S.-Iranian coordination, but the United States encourages some adventurists in the Iranian leadership who are wagering on the military solution and not the political one to remain in power and to strengthen their presence in the Gulf as a major pressuring force, and, consequently, to affect the internal security of some Gulf states. If the United States were really serious about ending the war, it would have taken into consideration the Soviet proposals and other alternatives to hold negotiations to protect Gulf security and, before that, to hold serious talks to halt the war.

[Yunus] It has been noticed that the Soviet response to Iran's attack on the Soviet ship in the Gulf was limited to condemnation and protests through diplomatic channels. Do you think that such a position will encourage Iran to continue its attack?

[Ivanov] First, I would like to explain that the Soviet ship Kurtiyev was not on a maritime mission. It moved from one Gulf port to another without a specific flag. What happened was international piracy. This makes everyone duty bound to protect sea routes and waterways in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Likewise, security in the Indian Ocean is an international responsibility, although we call for the removal of fleets from its waters.

[Yunus] Despite the concentration of fleets in the Gulf and its waterways, security remains a Gulf responsibility. How does the Soviet Union view the issue of Gulf security?

[Ivanov] We believe that security in the Gulf is indeed a gulf responsibility, that the area states can protect this security, and that the big powers are required to help the Gulf states in this regard and not threaten it as the United States and some other states have done and are doing now.

[Yunus] What would be the USSR's position if the Iranian attacks on its ships in the Gulf are repeated?

[Ivanov] We would respond with all the means approved by international law, especially if the attacks take place in international waters.

[Yunus] On what level would this response be?

[Ivanov] We would respond violently. Iran must realize that and be well aware of what we are saying.

[Yunus] AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM called for granting the Soviet Union maritime facilities in the Gulf. This call elicited wide-scale international reaction. What is your response to this call?

[Ivanov] We know the stands of AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, specifically those of its owner 'Abd al-'aziz al-masa'id, given that I worked in Kuwait for some time. We reject military facilities because we always call for keeping the Gulf and the Indian Ocean free of foreign forces. This call expresses a personal opinion. It is not official. All we want is civilian facilities -- and I emphasize the word civilian -- such as the repair and supply of ships. We do not want any bases or islands.

[Yunus] Kuwait is playing a major role in Gulf security; the measures it has taken toward protecting its oil tankers are an expression of a balanced policy primarily designed to ensure navigation in the Gulf. How does Moscow view the region despite the political and military smoke enveloping it?

[Ivanov] To begin with, any political observer can only commend Kuwait's diplomacy. The Soviet Union appreciates Kuwait's wisdom and courage, recently shown in approaching not only the major powers but the whole world. Kuwait has made a determined stand against blackmail attempts by certain powers. Kuwait's diplomacy has even successfully resisted international blackmail. We strongly support Kuwait whether or not it leased our tankers. Remembers that tension mounted in the region after a number of our tankers were hired. A united Gulf stand is bound to put an end to all attempts at blackmail and to ward off all dangers.

[Yunus] Let's now move from the Gulf to the Mideast.

[Ivanov] I think you will begin with Jewish emigration.

[Yunus] Naturally, this is a subject which must be discussed.

[Ivanov] You exaggerate a lot about this subject, which is well exploited by the West. Somehow or other you promote the Israeli position.

[Yunus] How do you view prospects for an international conference?

[Ivanov] An international conference would be the right forum for working out a solution to the Mideast problem. There is broad agreement on the general principles for a solution, especially on the need for a settlement. The disagreement centers on the goal and mechanics of a solution. A majority of nations favors a solution within the framework of international legitimacy.

The United States wants the conference to be a framework; Israel wants it to be an umbrella. These strategic allies are trying to twist the meaning and concept of the conference, whereas we insist on it being invested with full powers and its resolutions being binding on all parties.

[Yunus] After initial vigorous opposition, the United States has changed its tone on the conference. Israel is split on the idea. Do you think the U.S. and Israeli positions are amenable to change?

[Ivanov] The Soviet Union's position on that is well-known and clear. The EEC has put forward valuable ideas favoring the convention of a conference. Pressure should be brought to bear on Israel to submit to international will -- hence the importance of the proposed committee to prepare for the conference to avert failure at the first session and indefinite postponement of the meeting.

The conference must be well prepared and the UN Security Council permanent members must be involved in the preparation, since they have a leading role to play, especially given the obstacles which Israel, supported by the United States, will create. I would like here to emphasize the Arab role; a unified Arab stand is vital to get the conference started. Failing that there would be neither a conference nor a solution.

[Yunus] Despite all difficulties and proposals regarding an international conference, the issue of Palestinian representation remains a problem in the opinion of some people. What is the USSR's role in solving this problem?

[Ivanov] Palestinian representation in an international conference is not a problem at all. The PLO should be represented by an independent delegation on an equal footing with the concerned parties.

[Yunus] How do the Soviets understand the right to self-determination?

[Ivanov] Some forces in Europe and the United States accuse us of becoming more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves. We are proud of this accusation. In the Soviet understanding, the right to self-determination means establishing an independent state and recognizing the national identity of the Palestinian people.

We are not against federation or confederation with Jordan or any other country. However, this step must be taken after establishing an independent Palestinian state.

[Yunus] It is known the United States and Israel reject the participation of the USSR in an international conference unless it pays two bills -- allowing the Jews to emigrate to occupied Palestine and restoring relations with Israel. Will Moscow pay these two bills?

[Ivanov] We firmly reject such language. Moscow does not recognize the language of bills nor does it use it at all. We also allow no one to address us with this language.

[Yunus] But covert and overt Soviet-Israeli negotiations were held to discuss Jewish emigration and restoring relations?

[Ivanov] So far no official negotiations have been held. Meetings were held within the framework of the Socialist International conference between Shim'on Peres and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, as well as within the UN framework between Gromyko and Shamir.

We were surprised at the recent visit to Moscow by a U.S. businessmen's delegation, which included the chairman of the Jewish Conference, although we knew in advance about the delegation. The delegation wanted to change the discussion from trade to politics.

During the talks, the U.S. delegation presented the issue of Jewish emigration and recommended Bucharest and Budapest as two stations to transfer Soviet Jews to Israel. However, we strongly rejected this suggestion, which is considered interference in our affairs. Such issues are within the powers of the Soviet Interior Ministry, not the Foreign Ministry.

[Yunus] Reports mention that there actually is Jewish emigration and Tel Aviv has provided the figures.

[Ivanov] Do not believe what Israel says. The figures it gives are to tarnish Arab-Soviet friendship. We will not allow emigration except for humanitarian cases, such as family reunions. If it is the Western world which exploits this propaganda. Let it open its doors to those Jews who live there to emigrate to Israel. The question of the resumption of relations is an internal matter and concerns us alone. We are the ones who will set conditions for their resumption and not any other party.

[Yunus] Many have said that the Algiers PNC session was in reality a Soviet conference. Can you tell us about the Soviet role before and after the 18th PNC session?

[Ivanov] We do not deny that we contributed to the elimination of obstacles that were preventing the PNC from convening. Following the Algiers session, Palestinian ranks were united. This is a positive factor. What is important is to open the door to the settlement of the Middle East crisis, and the PNC session in itself greatly enhanced the Arab cause, because Palestinian differences have negatively affected the entire Arab world. The Palestinian struggle is an important factor of unifying the Arab stand, and the elimination of differences among the Palestinians will contribute to the elimination of the differences among the Arabs themselves.

[Yunus] Following the elimination of the differences among the Palestinians, another step must inevitably be taken, that of eliminating the differences between Syria and the PLO, specifically between President Hafiz al-Asad and Yasir 'Arafat.

[Ivanov] We have been endeavoring to eliminate these differences for many years. We recently achieved positive results in this respect. I would like here to reveal a secret. During the recent Syrian-Soviet talks, the question of the normalization of relations between Syria and the PLO was brought up, and President al-Asad promised to normalize these relations. We strongly support this.

[Yunus] What about Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation?

[Ivanov] We always seek to unite Arab stands and encourage such a trend. Arab unity is a basic factor for the settlement of all causes and crises, particularly in the present circumstances. We support any move that will lead to Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation. We are also doing our best to approximate viewpoints between the two countries and are working through various channels to reconcile them, as the closing of Arab ranks will certainly deter Israel.

[Yunus] What are the most prominent results of President Hafiz al-Asad's visit to Moscow and his talks with the Soviet leaders, particularly since reports have given figures about the provision of Syria with sophisticated weapons?

[Ivanov] The results of the talks were very positive, and the talks dealt with all issues and with the various aspects of political, military, and economic cooperation. The Soviet Union always tries to bolster Syria's defense capabilities.

EFFORTS TO EQUATE SOVIET-U.S. GULF POLICY BERATED

NC261050 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 24 May 87

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The U.S. magazine (MOBILIZER) has published a very interesting article by Vahid Tehrani, an Iranian political and social affairs commentator, entitled "Fanning the Flames," which discusses the Iran-Iraq conflict. The article declares that the United States and the Soviet Union were not involved in the early phases of the war but later gave their blessings to the exacerbation of the conflict in which Iran and Iraq are cutting each other's throats. Despite the declaration of impartiality and lies about imaginary peace efforts by these governments, the outcome of their policies is a continuous fanning of the flames of war. Thus wrote Vahid Tehrani, whom the U.S. press describes as an expert in Near Eastern affairs.

To put it mildly, the writer displays a lack of knowledge of the Soviet Union's participation in Near and Middle East affairs. He automatically attributes everything that the United States has done, things of which the world is well aware, to our country. For example, Tehrani writes that both the Soviet Union and the United States have provided both sides, at various times and sometimes simultaneously, with false reports that stoked the flames of the war. He writes that the two governments extended secret military aid to both sides and that their policies, in the final analysis, have led to the deaths of approximately 1 million people on both sides so far.

The Iranian commentator makes many other accusations. However, we will deal only with these right now. Moreover, he has been unable to produce any document whatsoever that implicates the Soviet Union. This is not surprising, because such documents do not exist. Vahid Tehrani's writings should be directed at one side, the United States, not at both big powers.

Has our government used the Iran-Iraq conflict to increase spectacularly its military presence in the Persian Gulf? Has it, like the United States, formed a Rapid Deployment Force to use against the countries of this region? Has the Soviet Union expanded its military-naval combat force in the Arabian Sea or set up a network of military bases in Oman, Bahrain, Egypt, Turkey, or Somalia? As you know, it is the United States that has spent more than \$1 billion for military installations in this area. Let us recall how many times U.S. aggression has threatened regional countries. Very recently, in late February when the ICO [Islamic Conference Organization] summit was being held in Kuwait, the United States sent many of its warships to the northern Persian Gulf and placed an aircraft carrier on full military alert. Can Vahid Tehrani recall when the Soviet Union did something like this?

It is very surprising that the Iranian commentator has forgotten another U.S. act which truly fanned the flames of the war. We are referring to Irangate, the delivery of arms and material to Iran which allowed the Tehran regime to start a new phase of bloodshed. As a true patriot and defender of his nation, Tehrani should have condemned this act, which granted the fundamentalists the opportunity to send tens of thousands more Iranian adolescents to their deaths. Moreover, Irangate gave other countries the opportunity to deliver war material to Iraq and, consequently, helped continue meaningless war.

According to Tehrani, one of the reasons the big powers are protracting the two nations' tragedy is their wish to gain a trump card in the political game in the Persian Gulf. Has the Soviet Union ever displayed duplicity in its policy toward this region? Let us recall how, during their meetings with Iran's representatives, Soviet leaders consistently urge them to negotiate, to immediately halt the war, to establish a cease-fire, and to allow a more active UN role in resolving the conflict. If we present a true picture, we see that the Soviet Public has appealed to the Iranian leadership to sympathize with its own nation. It is not the fault of the Soviet Union or the Soviet public that these appeals have not met with a positive response from Iranian officials.

Unfortunately, there is another issue which indicates that Tehran's officials favor a continuation of the conflict, and this -- as Tehrani himself confesses -- is something which is primarily in the interest of the United States. Naturally, lying about the Soviet Union's imaginary quest for profits in this conflict especially benefits the United States, because such lies veil the reality that on the war fronts soldiers of both countries are being killed for the sake of the profit-seeking objectives of U.S. imperialism.

PRAVDA DECRIES U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN

PM290823 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 May 87 Second Edition p 5

[Veniamin Shurygin commentary under the rubric "International Notes": "AWACS for Pakistan"]

[Text] The Reagan administration has decided to supply Pakistan with aircraft equipped with the airborne early-warning and control system -- AWACS. This is reported by THE NEW YORK TIMES, citing official sources.

Earlier it was reported that the United States had also agreed to supply Islamabad with 12 F-16 fighter bombers in addition to the 40 it already has and also Orion-type sea reconnaissance planes.

Thus the United States continues to supply Pakistan with the latest, increasingly expensive and dangerous types of weapons. Why? U.S. leaders like to hold forth about the priority of resolving regional conflicts, about the establishment of trust between states, and so forth. In practice the picture looks quite different. The deliveries of the AWACS to Pakistan, just like the deliveries of Stinger missiles to the Afghan counterrevolution, are Washington's response to the policy of national reconciliation implemented by the government of the DRA which indicates a realistic path toward the solution of the Afghan problem. This, however, is precisely what the U.S. strategists, who are prepared to fight "to the last Afghan" just to inflict damage on the Soviet Union, are trying to prevent.

It is much harder to explain why the Pakistani leadership is, on an increasing scale, buying the latest arms in the West and primarily in the United States. It is quite obvious that none of Pakistan's neighbors are threatening its security. On the contrary, both India and Afghanistan, to cite an example, have proposed to Pakistan that existing disputed problems be resolved by means of talks and genuinely good-neighborly relations established. The concern caused in these countries by Pakistan building up its military muscle is therefore perfectly understandable.

The Washington administration's plans have been received with profound alarm in India, the ASIA NEWS AGENCY reports. Indian military experts are convinced that the AWACS aircraft are intended for use against India. They could effectively be used not just for espionage on Indian territory but also to back up operations of the Pakistani naval forces in the Persian Gulf. The agency interprets the U.S. deliveries of the latest military hardware to Pakistan as a further "strengthening of the U.S.-Pakistani military pact which serves the aggressive U.S. strategy in the region."

The Pakistani regime's militarist ambitions which are being encouraged by its overseas patron are costing the country dear. Over the past decade Pakistan's military budget has quadrupled and accounts for one-third of the federal government's total expenditure. As a result appropriations for social needs are being cut back, the state coffers are being depleted, and the country's foreign debt, which totaled 11 billion dollars at the beginning of 1986, is growing. Up to 40 percent of the foreign currency income from exports goes on repayments of this debt.

The deliveries of the AWACS to Pakistan do not just mean a further increase in its military spending. They are also another boost to the escalation of the arms race in the region which exacerbates the already tense situation in the mutual relations of the states located in the area.

SOVIET BORDER GUARDS REPULSE AFGHAN REBELS

OW280450 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2205 GMT on 28 May carries its weekly "I Serve the Soviet Union" program. The first segment of the program deals with mujahedin incursions into Soviet territory. The segment begins with pan shots of Soviet border areas and shots of a border guard patrol, a ship, a tracked vehicle on a beach, and an MI-8 helicopter. Video cuts to correspondent Boris Smirnov and a Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Terentyevich Chichulin standing in an area where Afghan dushmans intruded into Soviet territory on the night of 8 April and attacked a border detail.

Chichulin describes the area and gives details of the attack. He says: The dushmans in two 25-man groups crossed the Pyandzh River. One group secretly moved along the foothills to nearby hills and the other group moved down the river off (Punimur) Village. The dushmans set up grenade launchers and machine guns on the nearby hills and the groups attempted an attack along the valley and along the (Nastuyashchiy) Ridge. The dushmans based their attack on their superiority in strength and fire power and on surprise. They also believed that Allah was with them and would not abandon them in their actions against infidels. However, they miscalculated. Their calculations were wrecked right from the start. A Private Kurkin, manning a battle outpost, discovered the secret approach of the enemy: he fired a red flare to sound the alarm; He was the first to open fire. In the Kozachiy Post Area, A Private Yemilov covered the flank of a group that was under intensive fire. He put an enemy machine gun out of action and gave his life to allow the main group to maneuver to a tactically advantageous position.

Smirnov asks Chichulin to characterise the actions of the Soviet border guards. Chichulin says: From the beginning the initiative belonged to the Soviet border guards. The elements of surprise, darkness, and torrential rain -- the elements the dushmans counted on -- did not help them. The dushmans were pushed back across the river, and the situation returned to normal.

Video shows guards watching the border and then cuts to old film about border guards. Video then cuts to Smirnov interviewing an Aleksandr Artamonov, who speaks about killing three dushmans, and others who took part in the fighting. Another soldier, Gennadiy Shavelkin, praises Kurkin and Yemilov, who died in the line of duty. The segment ends with shots of border guards rushing to action.

AFGHAN REBELS TO TRAIN IN U.S. IN USE OF STINGER

LD281044 Moscow TASS in English 1022 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Kabul May 28 TASS -- It was made known here that a group of dushman bandits consisting of representatives from all the main Afghan counter-revolutionary organizations was dispatched from Peshawar to the USA. They will undergo a course of training in using stinger antiaircraft missiles.

Counter-revolutionaries, with Pakistan's help, are now restoring transshipment bases to supply bandit units in Afghanistan with missiles, small firearms, mines and other weapons.

Toeing Washington's aggressive policy, Pakistan is being increasingly drawn into the arms race, turning into a source of tension in this area. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is the first object of aggression.

Along with military interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs, the Islamabad regime is also conducting ideological interference, smuggling into Afghanistan groups of provocateurs spreading false rumours. According to competent sources, several such groups numbering 1520 people each were smuggled into Afghanistan during May. Their task is to conduct propaganda among troops, to spread rumours slandering the limited Soviet military contingent and to interfere in every way with the national reconciliation policy. There "propagandists" do not stop short of terror, accusing then the Afghan authorities or Soviet soldiers of killings of innocent civilians. For instance, after destroying a lorry with 13 building workers on May 16, they spread rumours that this had been done by soldiers from the limited Soviet military contingent.

AFGHAN 'GANGS' USE CEASE-FIRE TO IMPORT WEAPONS

LD241000 Moscow TASS in English 0854 GMT 24 May 87

[Text] Kabul May 24 TASS -- The revolutionary leadership of Afghanistan continues to take humane steps aimed at attaining national reconciliation as soon as possible.

Under a decree of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, an amnesty was granted to another 20 Afghans in Baghlan Province who had taken part earlier in counterrevolutionary activities.

Refugees who fled Afghanistan under the influence of hostile propaganda continue to return home. 55 people came several days ago to Nangarhar Province. 30 Afghan nationals returned from Iran to the city of Zaranj, administrative centre of Nimruz Province.

Taking advantage of unilateral ceasefire, counterrevolutionary gangs are transporting weapons and ammunition to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran. Several days ago a big cache of arms belonging to the counterrevolutionaries was found and rendered harmless recently in Archa [name as received] district, Konduz Province. Local population rendered active assistance to the security forces in finding it.

19 MAY AFGHAN FRIENDSHIP MEETING HELD IN MOSCOW

PM291137 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 87 p 1

[TASS report: "DRA: Lines in Its Biography"]

[Text] The Afghan people can continue to count on the Soviet people's strong arm of friendship. This was stated at a Soviet-Afghan friendship meeting held in Moscow on 19 May by Soviet people who have devoted their sustained labor and martial exploits to the cause of the Afghan revolution.

Many emotional reminiscences were recounted during the evening. Participants described how the friendship road was driven through the Salang pass high in the mountains of the Hindukush and how Soviet and Afghan specialists built the first housing construction combine in Kabul, which produced the first new homes for ordinary people in the many centuries of the country's history.

They have been built to last centuries and not for the sake of awards or glory, Aleksey Chikishev, lecturer at Moscow VUZ, said. My friends in the army gave up their lives so that peace and calm should finally reign in Afghan towns and villages, said the holder of the Order of the Combat Red Banner and two Orders of the Red Star, a man whose exploits in defense of the Afghan revolution have gone down in legend in Afghanistan.

Only true internationalists can take such sincere pride in their people's exploits in defense of another people, H. Mangal, DRA ambassador to the USSR, said. We are full of admiration for Soviet people's selfless involvement in building a new life in our country.

PRAVDA CITES HONECKER ON PACT MEETING, ARMS CURBS

PM051735 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jun 87 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Erich Honecker Statement"]

[Text] Berlin, 2 Jun -- The Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Conference in Berlin gave a powerful new impetus to the consolidation of peace and disarmament. The proposals put forward there demonstrate their initiators' desire to rid mankind of wars forever. This has been stated here by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council.

The Political Consultative Committee Conference in Berlin, he said, was devoted primarily to solving the most important task of the present day -- saving the world from the threat of nuclear catastrophe. In our tense time politics is the means whereby joint actions can be used to safeguard peaceful coexistence. Our aim, the GDR leader stressed, is a planet free of nuclear weapons and peace in space. Thus we fully support the initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The first real opportunity has now appeared to actually achieve a disarmament accord. The GDR advocates the absolutely unconditional elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, which will make it possible to embark on nuclear disarmament as well as disarmament in the conventional arms sphere on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security. This opportunity must be used to achieve a breakthrough. This would be a considerable gain for all who are striving for a stable and durable peace. This is all the more important in view of the fact that nowhere in the world is there such a vast quantity of armed forces and armaments -- including nuclear munitions -- concentrated as in Central Europe.

The reduction of military confrontation is served by the series of initiatives the GDR and the CSSR have put to the FRG Government. The implementation of those proposals, E. Honecker said, will open the way to significant moves toward a nuclear-free Europe and a nuclear-free world.

GROMYKO VISITS POTSDAM'S CECILIENHOF PALACE

AU041852 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 30-31 May 87 p 4

[Text] Potsdam (ADN) -- On Friday afternoon [29 May] Andrey Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, visited the historical site of the Potsdam Agreement, Cecilienhof Palace in the bezirk city on the Havel. The guest was accompanied by Peter Florin, GDR deputy minister of foreign affairs. Herbert Tschope, chairman of the Potsdam Bezirk Council, cordially welcomed Andrey Gromyko and recalled the three past visits of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium to this palace. Andrey Gromyko said in this respect that his last visit took place as much as 15 years ago and this is long enough before visiting one of his workplaces again. As USSR ambassador to the United States, Andrey Gromyko participated in the important conference of the main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, which took place from 17 July to 2 August 1945 in Cecilienhof Palace.

While looking at historical photos and visiting the work rooms of the delegation heads of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain, as well as the conference hall, Andrey Gromyko spoke about the eventful summer days of 1945 in Potsdam and Babelsberg. Fulfilling the requests of the numerous photojournalists and cameramen from film and television, Andrey Gromyko once more sat down on his chair at the big round conference table. Herbert Tschoppe presented the guest, who signed the international guest book, a box with books on Cecilienhof, Sanssouci, and Potsdam as well as a copper bowl with the engraved silhouette of Cecilienhof Palace as souvenirs.

RCP ASSESSMENT OF GORBACHEV VISIT, PACT MEETING NOTED

PM081004 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS reports: "High Assessment"]

[Text] Bucharest June 6 TASS -- The Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee highly appraised at its meeting here the results of the official friendly visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Romania, the talks between Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Mikhail Gorbachev. The agreements reached in the course of the talks are opening up new prospects for bilateral relations and signal an important stage in the development of good relations between the two parties, countries, and peoples.

The Political Executive Committee pointed out with satisfaction that the mutual wish was expressed at the talks for giving an even broader scope and filling with even richer content the multifaceted relations between the two countries.

Special significance has been noted of the agreement reached during the visit that economic cooperation be raised to an even higher level through intensifying cooperation and specialization of production, especially in the key industries, as well as of the significance of the determination reaffirmed in the course of the dialogue to broaden cooperation between the Romanian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The significance was pointed out at the meeting of the determination expressed by the two party leaders to develop interaction between Romania and the Soviet Union in the international arena, to participate actively together with the other socialist countries, with the other progressive, democratic forces in the fight for ending the weapons race and transition to disarmament, above all to nuclear disarmament, for strengthening security, trust and cooperation in Europe and all over the world, for ensuring lasting peace on earth.

Information was presented to the meeting on the session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee in Berlin. The Political Executive Committee noted the significance of the document approved at the meeting, which is evidence of the high responsibility shown by the Warsaw Pact member-states to the issues of peace and disarmament.

The Political Executive Committee has reaffirmed Romania's determination to work in close unity with the other socialist countries, with all the peoples of the world for mutual understanding and cooperation, for peace, in whose conditions all states could direct their efforts at free, independent development on the path of economic and social progress.

ENVOY TO BULGARIA QUERIED ON RESTRUCTURING, TIES

AU021956 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 19 May 87 p 1, 2

[Text] [TRUD] Comrade Grekov, each passing day brings us closer to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution -- the most remarkable world event of our century. Can you describe how the Soviet people are preparing for this great event?

[Grekov] I can answer this question with only one word: actions. The CPSU Central Committee appeal to the Soviet people called for such actions -- for practical, creative, and useful actions. This party documents points out that a drastic quality change must be accomplished within a short time and must contribute to the accumulation of reserves for the future. This is the main task of the competition for a worthy celebration of the Great October Socialist Revolution 70th anniversary. The successful implementation of this task determines the personal position of every participant in social production. The successful accomplishment of the task will demonstrate how strongly the voice of labor conscience sounds among the workers collectives.

People in Bulgaria are well aware of the fact that the Soviet people today are living through an important era involving great responsibility. It is an age of drastic change in the country of the October Revolution, it is a period of genuine, revolutionary restructuring in all social spheres. The April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee can be described as the initial phase in the new stage of our development. It was at this plenum that numerous negative phenomena that have existed in our country and halted our ascending development were mentioned with the necessary severity and adherence to principle. The concept of accelerating our country's socioeconomic development for the achievement of a qualitatively new stage of our society was developed precisely at this plenum. The decisions of the April 1985 Plenum were extensively explained and further developed at the 27th CPSU Central Committee January Plenum in 1987, and being supported by the people, they became an unmistakable, precise, and dynamic program of action for all Soviet people.

According to historical criteria, 2 years are a rather short time. Nevertheless, the 2 years that have elapsed since the April 1985 Plenum, are equal in significance to long decades of a "peaceful" and "dull" development. The social atmosphere itself has drastically changed in this period. We stopped the habit of wishful thinking and learned to tell each other the truth, regardless of how bitter it may be. The critical approach to the existing processes in our life, the extensive spirit of openness, and the strengthening of democratic principles, as well as the collective discussion of urgent problems -- all this is helping us to get rid of numerous negative phenomena, it enhances every worker's social activity, and assists him in becoming aware of his decisively important role in restructuring society.

Our restructuring process is in its initial phase. We are only at the beginning of the acceleration we are striving for. The past 2 years, however, unmistakably demonstrate our considerable progress in this respect. The consolidation and improvements that have taken place in connection with order, discipline, and the state of organization in all sectors of our national economy have exerted an immediate positive impact upon the state of our economy as a whole.

National income increased by 4.1 percent during the 1st year of the current 5-year plan period, as compared with 3.9 percent envisaged according to the plan. The rate of increase of industrial production amounted to 4.9 percent compared with 4.3 percent envisaged according to the plan. This is the highest index reached in our country in the last 9 years.

Nevertheless, we have no reason for complacency regarding our achievements. We have not accomplished everything we planned by far, but there are numerous opportunities for further achievements in the future. I am convinced that the preparations for the celebration of the 70th October Revolution anniversary will become a powerful incentive for the further intensification of restructuring in all sectors of our life, that this anniversary will become an opportunity for the assessment of everyone's achievements.

[TRUD] The appeal of the CPSU Central Committee to the Soviet people states that restructuring requires a struggle, that restructuring must be defended. How do you interpret this thought? What is the significance of the present stage of development for the Soviet people and for Soviet society?

[Grekov] In his speech to the 20th Komsomol Congress, M.S. Gorbachev stated: "There are no political opponents in our country, there is no opposition against restructuring. However, there are difficulties in the initial stage of these revolutionary changes. These difficulties concern all of us, to one extent or the other. Is it not true that we are all children of our time?" In my opinion these words represent the key to understanding existing difficulties involved in restructuring, at least as far as subjective difficulties are concerned. Would it not be naive to presume that the implementation of restructuring and the overcoming of the accumulated difficulties will proceed smoothly? This would be in contradiction to the dialectic of revolutionary struggle. Our bad habits, our outdated views, and the insufficient enthusiasm, I would even say the unwillingness, to overcome the old way of life and thinking -- these are considerable elements and components of the existing delay mechanism.

We frequently and justifiably talk about contradiction between words and deeds. But the most difficult problem is to overcome the contradiction between thoughts and words. Many people have adopted the habit of thinking one thing, saying another thing, and doing something entirely different from either these thoughts or these words. The absence of real democracy in actions as opposed to the existing democracy in words, the absence of broad openness, developed in many people an attitude to insincerity of words and deeds. This resulted in numerous negative phenomena about which the party is frankly and openly speaking, and against which an uncompromising struggle is being waged. Only in an atmosphere of true democracy and total openness, of party strictness and sincere goodwill, will this contradiction between thoughts and words, be achieved, which means that we must strive for unity of words and deeds. This is also a method of defending restructuring, of guaranteeing the irrevocable character of restructuring.

Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, V.I. Lenin pointed out that the new society and the new state are strong only when the masses are informed on everything, when they are able to express their opinions on every problem, and when they consciously implement their tasks. The sincere and honest dialogue between party and people which is characteristic of the present period of our development evokes support for restructuring on part of the workers class, the working people, and all the Soviet people.

Such measures, such a drastic change were necessary under the conditions existing in our country. We are aware of the fact that the first steps have been accomplished but the most difficult tasks lie ahead, as M.S. Gorbachev stated at the Prague rally. We do not think that we have found definite answers to all questions posed by life. We are far from asking anyone to copy our example. Every socialist country has its own specific conditions to consider and the fraternal parties themselves determine their political course, according to national conditions to consider and the fraternal parties themselves determine their political course, according to national conditions existing in countries. In addition to this, certain problems that the USSR now faces, that require an urgent solution, have already been solved, or are being solved by other socialist countries.

At the same time, however, we do not hide our confidence that the initiative of restructuring adopted in the Soviet Union is in absolute conformity with the most essential nature of socialism and with the urgent necessity of social progress in general.

I would like to stress the deep understanding which the Soviet Communists and all Soviet people demonstrate toward this particular feature of restructuring and their powerful support for the revolutionary process we are engaged in.

[TRUD] Leonid Ivanovich, you as an ambassador, as an emissary of the great Soviet state to our country, as a member of the Central Committee of Lenin's glorious party, can you tell us how you understand the expression "revolution continues to our time"? And let us add another question: Can you describe the potential of the party instruction on transforming the good intentions of words into active efforts and real deeds?

[Grekov] The changes mapped out by the 27th CPSU Congress and by the CPSU Central Committee plenums represent truly revolutionary actions in terms of their importance, their complexity, and their meaning in the total system of social relations, as well as in the minds and hearts of the people. We are talking about a process which in its ascent, having achieved the victory of the Great October Revolution inspired by revolutionary fervor, is striving further for the consolidation and development of the basic socialist principles, for the elimination of all the things that are incompatible with these noble aspirations, striving to create prerequisites for the efficient application of the tremendous potential of socialism in real life. This is precisely why these revolutionary changes mapped out by our party evoke so much interest not only among our friends, but all over the world and even among our enemies.

Strenuous tasks and difficult work await us in this respect. They require tremendous efforts from the party and people, they challenge the civic courage and the mature social awareness of every Soviet citizen. It is important that everyone -- from the manual worker to the minister -- become aware of and adopt the party appeal for progress as his own cause. The party appeal requires that emphasis be placed upon practical deeds, that words should be replaced by real action -- this is the guarantee for the success of the restructuring process.

[TRUD] Comrade Ambassador, allow us to ask you one last question: You are a great friend of Bulgaria and of our people, you greatly contribute to the consolidation of Soviet-Bulgarian friendship. How can you describe the active potential of this friendship today, and how do you see the development of this friendship in the forthcoming 10 years?

[Grekov] True friendship is expressed not in words but in actions. This applies in particular to periods of drastic change for the peoples' destinies, as the present one can be described. We could cite hundreds of examples demonstrating such sincere, fraternal relations between our two peoples. In the first and most difficult years of the Soviets' development, numerous Bulgarians joined the ranks of the Red Army with weapons in hand and defended the cause of the October Revolution. The Soviet people, who carried the main burden of the struggle against fascism, in turn, shared, if we may say so, their last piece of bread with Bulgaria, in assisting your country, which had embarked upon the path of socialist development, in building up its economy. The support rendered by the BCP and the Bulgarian people to our restructuring process is the result of a profound understanding for our problems as well, an expression of your people's wish to render fraternal support to the Soviet people.

Our indestructible friendship is a reliable guarantee for our common successes, for our joint progress along the path mapped out by the October Revolution.

Quite recently we celebrated the 20 anniversary of the Second Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty Between the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Signed on 12 May 1967, this treaty became a solid basis for the consolidation of fraternal mutual cooperation between our two peoples and parties.

The recent meeting held between Comrades Mikhail Gorbachev and Todor Zhivkov in Moscow was a brilliant new example of unity and cohesion between our two parties and countries. This meeting once more eloquently demonstrated that the goals and principles of the tasks accomplished in the USSR and in the People's Republic of Bulgaria coincide.

Our times demand a permanent, dynamic approach to all sectors of bilateral relations between our two countries. As Comrade Todor Zhivkov stressed, "Bulgarian-Soviet cooperation today is entering a qualitatively new stage. Exceptionally great opportunities are opening up at all levels and in all fields of work in this respect." Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, precisely, are the initiators of the most progressive forms of cooperation in the sectors of economic and scientific-technical integration. They are intensifying their efforts in production-sharing as well as in the mutual specialization of production, in order to increase the efficiency of direct relations between workers' collectives in both countries and to create joint enterprises. The two sides devote persevering efforts to the implementation of the Long-Term Comprehensive Cooperation Program (for the period up to 2000). However, the interests of our common cause point to the need to increase the efficiency of this work and boldly search for new methods of mutual cooperation.

We see the consolidation and development of cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria within the forthcoming decade as an even more fruitful mutual experience of both our countries, as the creation of a mechanism for the unhindered solution of all problems resulting from practical experience, and as coordinated actions and mutual support on the international scene.

I would like to close this interview by wishing all readers of TRUD great new successes in their activities, as well as happiness and prosperity.

YOUTH ORGAN DECRIES VANDALISM OF GRAVES IN CSSR

LDO61156 Moscow International Service in Slovak 1700 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Text] It's a bitter and painful feeling, it is difficult to understand, a Prague correspondent wrote in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA about the desecration of several graves of Soviet soldiers who died when liberating the Czechoslovak capital. The same feelings are experienced by those whose voices and faces show their worry, with whom I spoke at the cemetery and nearby. A policeman who was on duty there said that it was an act of vandalism. We shall find the person or persons who did it and we shall try them, he said. I do, however, implore you to charge only the true villains, the criminals. We are shaken as much as you are, said a woman who works at the cemetery. The correspondent pointed out that a great many people said the same. This was done by our enemy, too -- by a provocateur and traitor.

And this is, of course, the case: The fraternal feelings of the Czechoslovak people toward the Soviet people cannot be discredited by doubts. These feelings are backed by a huge reserve of the best possible evidence. However, the point is somewhat different, the article says, that the enemy -- the provocateur and traitor -- is still somewhere close by and that his words and actions spread malice and discord between people and countries. Things do not happen without cause. Evil appears as soon as the opportunity arises and then is lost the firmness of political criteria and of general human values. Cynicism, vandalism, and acts of violence have to be confronted, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA concludes.

SFRY'S DIZDAREVIC, ON WAY TO DPRK, SEES SHEVARNADZE

LDO71813 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1714 GMT 7 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 7 Jun (TANJUG) -- Raif Dizdarevic, federal secretary for foreign affairs, made a stopover today on his way to Pyongyang, in Moscow where he had a meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs. Dizdarevic will take part in Pyongyang in a ministerial meeting of the nonaligned countries devoted to questions of the economic development and cooperation of the developing countries.

The meeting between Dizdarevic and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze passed off in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. There was an exchange of views on the successful development of Yugoslav-Soviet relations and the improvement of bilateral cooperation on some international questions and there was also discussion of the visit of Shevardnadze to Yugoslavia.

This afternoon Raif Dizdarevic attended a reception for the large number of ministers of nonaligned countries who are passing through Moscow, hosted by Minister Shevardnadze.

Dizdarevic will continue his journey to Pyongyang late this evening.

BRIEFS

POLISH COMPUTER PRINTER COOPERATION -- Moscow, 6 Jun (TASS) -- Soviet and Polish specialists have devised a small printer for use with computers. It is capable of printing, drawing, and reproducing simple diagrams. It operates at 100 characters per second and can store 64 styles of typeface in its memory. It can be used in conjunction with personal computers and mainframes. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1504 GMT 6 Jun 87 LD]

PRAVDA CITES MINISTERIAL RETIREMENT, APPOINTMENT

PM071529 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jun 87 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "At the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has appointed Comrade Boris Mikhaylovich Belousov USSR minister of machine building.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has relieved Comrade Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Bakhirev of the duties of USSR minister of machine building on his retirement.

TASS Profiles Minister Belousov

LD071330 Moscow TASS in English 1314 GMT 7 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 7 TASS — The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has appointed Boris Belousov the minister of machine-building of the USSR.

Boris Belousov was born in 1934. He graduated from the Taganrog Radio-Engineering Institute, he began to work at the Izhevsk plant (Urals) in 1958.

In 1976 he was appointed the director of the Izhevsk mechanical plant.

Since 1980 Boris Belousov has worked as deputy minister and the first deputy minister of the defence industry. [sentence as received]

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet relieved Vyacheslav Bakhirev of the duties of the USSR minister of machine-building in view of his retirement on pension.

RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM TO MEET 6 JULY

LD061647 Moscow TASS in English 1640 GMT 6 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 6 TASS — The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the biggest of the fifteen Soviet Union republics, has decided that the next session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation be convened in Moscow on July 6.

The session is to examine the following questions: The objectives of the Soviet and economic bodies of the republic for improving retail trade and public catering in the light of the decisions of the 27th party congress and the directives of the January (1987) plenary meeting of the Central Committee; on the work of the soviets of people's deputies with electors' mandates; endorsement of the decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ATTEND CADRE COURSES

PM050955 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 May 87 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Cadre Studies"]

[Text] Courses for chiefs of general departments of union republic Communist Party central committees and party kraykoms and obkoms have ended at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Institute for Raising the Qualifications of Leading Party, Soviet, and Ideological Cadres.

In the course of the studies urgent questions of Marxist-Leninist Theory and the CPSU's policy in light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum were studied. Chief attention was devoted to improving management, party leadership, and the work of the party and state apparatus under conditions of restructuring. The tasks of accelerating scientific and technical progress, the party's ideological activity, the development of Soviet statehood, the democratization of all aspects of social life, and the strengthening of legality were examined.

Experience and problems connected with enhancing the role of party committees as organs of political leadership and with stepping up the monitoring and verification of the execution of decisions adopted and the struggle against the creation of paperwork were discussed. The practice of the work of party committees with documents and with citizens' written and verbal appeals was comprehensively examined.

The students were addressed by L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; A.N. Yakovlev, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; A.I. Lukyanov, V.A. Medvedev, and G.P. Razumovskiy, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee; I.V. Kapitonov, chairman of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission; V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee; N.Ye. Kruchina, administrator of the CPSU Central Committee; V.I. Boldin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee General Department; I.S. Gustov, first deputy chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee; P.P. Laptev, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee General Department; A.A. Solovyev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee General Department; A.M. Rekunkov, USSR general prosecutor; A.V. Vlasov and V.G. Zakharov, USSR ministers; V.G. Afanasyev, chief editor of PRAVDA; V.M. Falin, chairman of the APN Board; R.G. Yanovskiy, rector of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; F.D. Bobkov, N.G. Belov, L.A. Kostin, and S.A. Sitaryan, first deputy chairmen of committees and leaders of USSR departments.

V.P. Mysnichenko, first secretary of Kharkov Obkom, and A.N. Gerasimov, first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Gorkum, delivered reports on questions of accelerating socioeconomic development and improving the work style, forms, and methods of local party organs under conditions of restructuring.

In the seminar studies there was an exchange of experience of the activities of party committees' general sections regarding modern demands. During the studies the students familiarized themselves with the work practice of a number of party committees in Moscow City and Oblast, met with senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus and with scientists, and visited industrial and agricultural enterprises and the USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements.

BIRYUKOVA VIEWS CONSUMER OUTPUT, SOCIAL POLICY

PMO41431 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 22, May 87 (Signed to Press 21 May 87) pp 2-5

["Report by Comrade A.P. Biryukova," secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at 22 May CPSU Central Committee conference on consumer goods, services under general heading "An Important Social Policy Task"]

[Text] The acceleration of the country's development, the enhancement of the masses' labor and social activeness, and the improvement of the people's well-being to a qualitatively new level are inseparably linked with the increasing satisfaction of the Soviet people's needs for goods and services.

This is one of the key tasks of the active social policy conducted by the party. The Comprehensive Program for the Development of Consumer Goods Production and the Service Sphere, which combines the efforts of all the economic sectors in increasing the production, improving the range, and enhancing the quality of goods and services for the population, is geared to the implementation of this task.

Recently the Politburo discussed progress in implementing the Comprehensive Program. Its resolution stresses with the utmost emphasis the extraordinary political and social importance of the unconditional implementation of the 27th CPSU Congress directives aimed at enhancing the people's living standards and fulfilling the targets of the program and of the 5-year and annual plans.

Concern for people and the steady improvement of their material and cultural living standards has always been at the heart of our party's policy. Over the last three 5-year plans consumer goods production and retail turnover have doubled. The consumption of fabrics, knitwear, clothes, and other light industry articles has increased substantially. Virtually every Soviet family now owns a refrigerator, a television set, a radio, and many other items of household equipment. The volume of consumer services has more than trebled.

At the same time, the deceleration of our economic growth during the seventies and the principle of allocating only residual resources for the development of the sectors directly connected with meeting people's needs have had a negative impact on the satisfaction of the population's growing demand for goods and services. For several 5-year plans in succession the party's objective of preferential development of the consumer goods industry was not met. Industry paid little attention to the needs of young people, the aged, children, and other sections of the population.

The structure of consumption is clearly out of step with the demands of the time. It is warped in favor of goods on which three-fourths of the family budget are expended. At the same time the share of paid services has not changed over the past 20 years and remains at around 9 percent of citizens' total expenditure. As a result, major difficulties have arisen in meeting the population's effective demand. Negative social phenomena have emerged which are alien to the nature of our labor-based system.

The causes of these phenomena are revealed in depth in the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum documents and M.S. Gorbachev's report to the plenum.

Taking full account of the urgency of the prevailing situation, the party has resolutely set course toward the radical restructuring of all our work connected with the satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of Soviet people. Wide scope must be provided for the Leninist law of growing needs, and the advantages of socialism must be fully utilized to ensure a materially and spiritually rich life for our people.

To this end the social thrust of the 12th 5-Year Plan has been reinforced. The plan contains augmented targets for the production of nonfood goods and the provision of paid services for the population as envisaged by the Comprehensive Program. The production of these types of goods is to be increased by 33 percent — which considerably exceeds the growth rate for industrial production as a whole. The volume of paid services is to be increased by 50 percent.

The CPSU Central Committee and the government have adopted important resolutions on switching light industry, trade, and consumer services to full economic accountability [khozraschet] and self-financing and ensuring the additional retooling of other sectors of industry and increased production and expansion of the range of dyes, textile industry accessories, and leisure, sports, and tourist goods.

With a view to improving the administration of the entire sociocultural sphere and the management of consumer goods production, a USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Social Development has been established. A special section on the production and marketing of consumer goods and the development of the system of paid services has been introduced for the first time in the 5-year plan and the annual plans.

A certain amount of work has been carried out by party and soviet organs at local level. Regional and sector programs for goods and services have been elaborated in all the republics, krays, and oblasts and at a number of ministries. Tasks pertaining to the implementation of these programs have been discussed at party committee plenums and party and economic aktivs. The creation of a system of interrepublic and interoblast councils for coordinating the production of goods not planned centrally has been completed.

All this is producing certain results. In 1986 above-plan consumer goods worth R1.4 billion were produced. The increase in paid services was double the average increase achieved in the past 5-year plan. The population's consumption of material goods and services increased by a total of 5.5 percent against an average annual increase of 3.7 percent during the past 5-year plan.

As you can see, positive changes have taken place. However, the restructuring in this most important sphere of the party's social policy is getting under way extremely slowly. The main reason for this is that many party, state, and economic organs, both at the center and at local level, have failed to draw practical conclusions from the 27th CPSU Congress instructions on the need for a radical change of attitude to questions of saturating the market with high-quality goods and services.

We have not succeeded in achieving a preferential rate of development in the production of nonfood goods. The production of these goods increased by 4 percent last year, while the production of industrial output as a whole increased by almost 5 percent.

The Comprehensive Program targets for the range of goods have been met only one-third. Eighteen ministries and departments have failed to meet the plan for the production of consumer goods and household appliances. The USSR Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry, the USSR Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems, and the USSR Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry have built up the biggest shortfall. The performance of many union republics is also poor. The annual plan was not fulfilled by the Uzbek SSR, the Georgian SSR, and the Azerbaijan SSR, and in the Tajik SSR the volume of production has decreased.

There has been no improvement in the situation during the first 4 months of the current year. The output of nonfood goods has remained virtually at the level achieved during the corresponding period of last year, although according to the plan an annual increase of 7.8 percent is to be achieved. The production of light industry goods had even decreased.

Over the past 2 years the output of alcoholic beverages has been almost halved. This has quite tangibly contributed to the enforcement of a healthy way of life and has had a beneficial impact on production and daily life in general.

At the same time, general support for this party Central Committee policy is by no means everywhere backed up with specific efforts to increase the production of goods and services required by the population. In 1986 the production of consumer goods per ruble of the wage fund decreased in all republics without exception.

One of the reasons for the development of this situation is the slackening of party attention to these questions and insufficient exactingness toward the people directly responsible for the corresponding work sectors.

To rectify the situation it is necessary, as from this year, to substantially increase the average annual rates of growth in the production of consumer goods and the volume of paid services. All ministries and departments and all republics, krays and oblasts must proceed from this basis in their work on the fulfillment of the targets for the current year and the plans for 1988 and the subsequent years of the 5-year plan.

The slow development of light industry, which accounts for 42 percent of the overall production of nonfood goods is causing serious concern. On last year's results the sector failed to achieve the growth rate stipulated by the 5-year plan. Matters are no better in the current year.

All republic ministries and one in three enterprises have failed to meet their contract commitments. The target for profit — a key indicator in a sector which operates in conditions of self-financing — has not been fulfilled. The volume of rejected output and fines have increased.

It must be frankly admitted that leaders of ministries, enterprises, and associations are proving slow to change their ways, tending to blame all difficulties on the low technical standard of the production base, on shortages of modern equipment and progressive types of raw and other materials, and on a labor cadre drain. Without any question these are real and serious problems, but they must not overshadow the major reserves and potential which exist in light industry.

Take such a vital question as the more effective utilization of production potential. Three-fourths of the capacities commissioned over the past 2 years are being assimilated with great delays against the set deadlines. Yet these are the most modern production facilities we have. Many factories in Central Asia and the Transcaucasian republics, where the problem is to involve the nonworking able-bodied population in the national economy, are operating for only 1 or 1 and 1/2 shifts per day. While at the same time footwear, clothes, knitwear, fabrics, and other light industry goods have to be imported from other regions of the country.

The collegiums of the USSR Ministry of the Light Industry and the union republic light industry ministries, and ministry party committee must draw practical conclusions from this and, within a short time, improve the standard of their organizational work to meet the demands of the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum and to finally ensure that the great assistance which has been given to the sector produces full and effective returns.

In turn, party and soviet organs at local levels must pay much more attention to light industry enterprises and help labor collectives to organize stable work.

Group "A" ministries have failed to tackle in earnest the tasks of producing consumer goods. Leading cadres in a number of sectors, enterprises, and associations still regard this work as an annoying encumbrance or a matter of secondary importance, while party and soviet organs do not always subject such attitudes to a principled assessment. The fact that half the ministries failed to fulfill the consumer goods production plan in the first 4 months of the current year is graphic evidence of this. The output of goods per ruble of the wage fund remains extremely low in a number of sectors.

Many major enterprises, such giants as the Krivorozhstal or the Pavlodar tractor plant, for instance, and also the Alma-Ata heavy machine building plant, the Chirchik transformer plant, and a number of others are confining their contribution to implementing the program to the production of the simplest types of household goods such as facing panels, vineyard stakes, cake tins, casseroles, soap dishes, and so forth. This is one of the main reasons why, simultaneously with an acute shortage of sophisticated household appliances, a trend toward a relatively bigger increase in the production of the simplest goods is clearly emerging. In 1986 the increase in the production of sophisticated household appliances totaled just over 4 percent, while the increase in the production of the simplest articles amounted to 8 percent. The corresponding figures for this year are 7 to 26 percent, respectively. Unquestionably people also need simple articles, and the demand for these is not satisfied everywhere. At the same time such imbalances cannot be tolerated. Otherwise the Comprehensive Program will not be fulfilled, the retail trade targets will not be met, and the population's growing demand for consumer durables will not be satisfied.

We have incurred considerable losses because most Group "A" ministries and enterprises have failed to implement the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers directive on setting up specialized enterprises and production capacities to produce consumer goods. In the machine building sector, for instance, only one in five enterprises produces these goods in specialized shops. Naturally such an amateurish approach cannot result in a high technical standard and good quality of goods, and it increases the cost price, and consequently also the retail prices, by 30-40 percent.

The creation of specialized production capacities is the main direction to be taken in developing consumer goods production. In addition to the construction of new capacities, its practical implementation calls for the active utilization of floorspace and equipment released as a result of enterprises' transfer to shift work. This demands virtually no major capital investment: What it needs above all is good organizational work, individual initiative, and economic managers' personal interest in this matter. I believe central agencies must also find really effective economic levers and incentives, especially economic incentives, to encourage nonspecialized enterprises to actively increase the output and update the range of consumer goods.

The CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR Council of Ministers have lately adopted a number of major measures aimed at enhancing the role of local organs in accelerating socioeconomic development. Republic, kray, and oblast party and soviet organs have been made responsible for providing goods and services for the people and balancing the population's monetary incomes with expenditure.

However, in practice there is evidence in many cases of an inability to exercise the rights that have been granted. Instead of resolving tasks independently, comrades prefer to turn to central agencies and ask them to allocate additional goods resources to fulfill the goods turnover plan. The time has come to resolutely eradicate this kind of attitude. Leaders of republic, kray, and oblast party and soviet organs are personally responsible for the satisfaction of the population's growing demand for goods and services. The most effective utilization of the production potential and labor resources available in republics, krays, and oblasts represents the main reserve for meeting people's needs for goods and services.

This is precisely the approach that has been adopted to this matter in the Lithuanian SSR. It is possible to say without exaggeration that an efficient system of party leadership of consumer goods production and delivery to the population has been elaborated in the republic. The Communist Party Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and party committees and soviets at all levels are constantly focusing on these questions. Much attention is being paid to production specialization and businesslike collaboration between industry and trade. All this has produced tangible results. The republic's output of goods per ruble of the wage fund is double the average for the country as a whole. The updating of the range of light industry goods has been raised to 70 percent. Plans and contract commitments for the production and delivery of goods are being successfully implemented.

In Belorussia, Moscow and Leningrad, and Sverdlovsk, Ulyanovsk, Tomsk, Kharkov, Chernigov, and a number of other oblasts these tasks are being implemented in party fashion, reflecting a high sense of responsibility.

At the same time, not everywhere have local organs firmly taken the development of the production of consumer goods and the service sphere into their hands. In the Kazakh and Uzbek SSR's, in Chelyabinsk, Rostov, and Dnepropetrovsk Oblasts, and in a number of other regions there is evidence of inertia and sluggishness in this matter, and obsolete approaches are being discarded with great difficulty.

Take, for instance, the situation prevailing in the production of goods in the Georgian SSR.

One in three enterprises in the republic is still not involved in the production of consumer goods and household appliances despite the fact that per capita production of these types of goods in the republic is still 1.5 times below the average for the country.

Around 40 percent of light industry enterprises are failing to fulfill contract commitments for goods deliveries. The utilization of the sector's production capacities continues to be one of the lowest among union republics.

The quality of many goods begs description. Almost 50 percent of the output of footwear and cotton fabrics and a substantial proportion of consumer goods and household appliances fail to meet State Standard requirements.

The Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers must implement effective measures to overcome the serious lag in this key area of economic and social policy without delay.

Union republic councils of ministers and krayispolkoms and oblispolkoms make very poor use of the vast reserves of local industry to augment goods resources. Last year eight union republics set their production plans below the Comprehensive Program targets. The sector is making poor use of local raw materials and production scrap for the production of consumer goods. Last year six republic ministries failed to meet the set targets in respect of this indicator, while in Moldavia and Latvia the production of these goods decreased.

The Comprehensive Program directive to gradually reduce local industry production of all manner of by-lines and instead increase consumer goods production is being implemented too slowly. The Group "A" output share remains at 24 percent, but in Lithuania, Belorussia, Tajikistan, and Kirghizia it is considerably higher. Home-working as a source for creating additional goods resources is clearly underused.

The CPSU Central Committee is seriously concerned at the situation in trade. For a number of years the plan for retail turnover has not been fulfilled, and furthermore the shortfall against the targets is increasing every year. Fulfillment of the turnover plan is by no means just a commercial question. It is of great social and political significance because the national consumption level, the funding of social program measures, and the incentive role of rubles earned are directly connected with it.

Doubtless, one of the main reasons for the nonfulfillment of the plan is the shortage of goods resources. However, it would be incorrect to blame everything only on this problem. The lag in the turnover growth is also a result of old and entrenched shortcomings in the work of the trade network itself. The slow rate of turnover is a serious problem. It cannot be regarded as normal that the goods turnover rate has virtually not changed during the past three 5-year plans in our country and currently amounts to 86 days in the retail network. Meanwhile, calculations indicate that an acceleration of the turnover rate by just one day could, on a country-wide scale, produce an almost R1 billion increase in goods turnover. There is much scope for work here for both central and local trade administration organs.

It is necessary, finally, to end the chronic shortcomings in the distribution of goods around the country, whereby goods lie around in some places as useless ballast while in other places they are in short supply. It is the wholesale component of trade which is largely to blame for this situation. [paragraph continues]

At present it is probably the most backward sector of trade, and its work must be radically modernized. Union republic councils of ministers and the USSR Ministry of Trade must enhance the role and responsibility of wholesale organizations for saturating the market with goods needed by the population, for actively influencing industry in the interests of the consumer, and for fulfilling the plan for retail trade turnover.

Many local soviets are doing very little to expand commission trade in nonfood goods or to increase sales of marketable production scrap and construction materials. Last year, for instance, the target for marketing local construction materials was fulfilled less than 50 percent and only 20-30 percent in the RSFSR and Kazakhstan.

In a number of republics, krays, and oblasts the Comprehensive Program directives on the development of a specialized trade network and the introduction of progressive forms of trade convenient for the population are being implemented too slowly. The share of self-service facilities in the state trade network is decreasing. Market research, the information and advice service, and advertising are poorly organized. The standard of service remains low.

Union and autonomous republic ministries of trade and the leaders of many trade organizations and even industrial enterprises display an extremely passive attitude to the expansion of the production and marketing of highly fashionable articles at contract prices. In a number of regions this work has not even gotten off the ground yet. Furthermore, there are instances where trade workers try, allegedly in the interests of the consumer, to push down prices or simply refuse to conclude contracts for the delivery of this type of goods.

It goes without saying that we cannot do away with the cheap end of the market. However, we must not forget either the growing demand for fashionable, high-quality, and therefore more expensive goods. One in five people in our country today earns more than R175 per month. In short, remuneration according to labor combats wage-leveling, and consequently differentiated opportunities for people to exercise their spending power must also be provided.

Consumer cooperatives make poor use of their potential for satisfying people's needs. Last year their own resources in cooperative trade turnover averaged around 20 percent. Furthermore, while in Georgia this indicator reached 34 percent, it was only half that in Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kirghizia. This is due to a different approach to the matter rather than to different conditions.

Party and soviet organs must sharply increase demands on consumer cooperatives regarding the organization of trade services in rural areas. It is impossible to tolerate a situation where one in nine consumer cooperative stores remains closed for more than 3 days per quarter, resulting in a turnover loss of around R1 billion per year. More than 115,000 rural settlements with a total population of 7 million people have no permanent trade network and at many of them even the mobile trade services are poor. This has an adverse effect on efforts to retain cadres in rural areas.

The public catering system, especially urban and rural facilities open to the general public, leaves much to be desired. The share of public catering in overall trade turnover has remained at the 9 percent mark for many years. [paragraph continues]

It is difficult to find somewhere to have lunch in cities, where the seating at works and educational establishment canteens is inadequate, yet the targets for commissioning this kind of facilities go unmet year after year. In 1986, for instance, they were only 50 percent fulfilled.

The main food product resources and the available public catering potential make it possible to considerably increase the output of culinary and confectionery products. In the Belorussian SSR it was basically these products that helped to make up for the reduction in public catering facilities' turnover as a result of the cut in the sales of alcoholic beverages. However, at many places this reserve remains virtually untapped.

As is evident, quite a few shortcomings have accumulated in the sphere of trade. They seriously complicate the implementation of the program for improvement of the people's prosperity and have an adverse effect on people's mood. Local party and soviet organs and leaders of the USSR Ministry of Trade and the Tsentrsoyuz must step up their work to ensure a better utilization of the sector's internal reserves, a substantial enhancement of the quality of service, and unconditional fulfillment of the plan for retail turnover. Without exaggeration, this is the most important task in the present situation.

The party's program documents contain the task of creating, within a short period, an essentially new, modern, highly developed service sphere. The breakthrough in this sector must be achieved within the current 5-year plan.

During the first year of the 5-year plan certain positive changes have emerged. The increase in paid services totaled more than 10 percent. However, many party and soviet organs at local level and leaders of ministries and departments are still underestimating the socioeconomic significance of the accelerated development of this sphere, employing old methods and working without initiative. In 1986 six union republics and more than half of the RSFSR's krais and oblasts failed to fulfill the plan for paid services. The situation is particularly poor in Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Turkmenia and in Vologda, Tambov, and Orel Oblasts.

In this context I would like to emphasize that the time has finally come for everyone to realize that the rapid development of the service sphere and efforts to ensure a better quality of service are a vital necessity. It is impossible to match the population's monetary incomes by concentrating predominantly on building up goods resources. People's needs are subject to certain limits, and production potential is not limitless either. In all countries the system of services for the population is undergoing rapid development. This is an objective trend. We too must actively tackle the development of the vast sphere of services.

In this respect it is of paramount importance to overcome the existing disproportions in meeting the needs for the various types of paid services. The problem is that today consumer, housing and municipal, and transport services account for three-fourths of the total volume of these services.

The development of the range of services which promote people's cultural and physical development and strengthen their health is unsatisfactory. For instance, per capita participation in excursions and tourist trips and stays in holiday homes and sanatoria currently amounts to 2.5 days per year. At the same time, approximately 50 per cent of the tourist bases and camping sites are operating only 3-6 months per year. Not enough attention is being paid to the development of family tourism and motoring holidays, even though the working people have been raising these questions for many years.

The situation is no better regarding paid services in the sphere of physical culture and sport. The provision of these services does not exceed 50 kopeks per capita per year. Only 20 percent of stadia, swimming pools, and gyms provide paid health and general physical training services and run sports sections.

The sports facilities' main source of income are rental payments by organizations and enterprises. At the same time the stadia, gyms, and swimming pools are frequently deserted while millions of people prepared to pay for their use cannot gain access to them. The AUCCTU, the USSR State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport, and union republic councils of ministers must raise the standard of their organizational work in the development of tourism and leisure and paid sports and recreational services. Soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organs must not remain on the sidelines either when it comes to tackling these questions.

We are quite justified in leveling criticism at the system of consumer services for the population. One in five enterprises in this sphere has failed to cope with the plan for the provision of services. People's needs for dry cleaning and laundering services, car repairs, and maintenance of apartments and household equipment are poorly catered for. Their needs in the construction of houses, summer houses, and garages are met only 50 percent. Consumer services in rural areas are of a low standard. The rural inhabitants' expenditure for services is approximately half that of city dwellers.

Party committees and soviet and economic organs in many regions are resigned to the existing shortcomings. This is illustrated by the state of consumer services in the Tajik SSR, for instance. The republic occupies the last place in the country regarding the provision of services for the population. Per capita consumer services here total only 66 percent and in rural areas only 50 percent of the average amount of services provided in the USSR as a whole. The plan for the provision of services was not fulfilled last year. The capital investments allocated by the republic for the development of the material base in this sector are not being used.

Despite this situation the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers have failed to adopt the measures necessary to improve the sector's performance. The situation is almost as bad in Azerbaijan, Kirghizia, Moldavia, and many parts of the RSFSR including Moscow Oblast, which occupies 63d place in the RSFSR regarding the provision of consumer services for the population.

Despite the fact that consumer service enterprises have been working in the new conditions of management for over a year, the introduction of economic accountability, the team contract, contract work, and other progressive forms of labor organization and remuneration has progressed very little. Republic consumer service ministries and local soviets must make more energetic efforts to eliminate the obstacles hampering the effective utilization of the new economic mechanism.

Ministries which offer paid services as a sideline are making little headway. Last year only one in three ministries fulfilled its targets for services. Furthermore, many industrial enterprises are adopting a formalistic approach and confining themselves mainly to collecting rent for the use of housing and municipal facilities and children's preschool establishments.

This is borne out by the results of a survey of 250 enterprises under the jurisdiction of 6 ministries carried out this year by the USSR Central Statistical Administration. Not one of them fulfilled the plan for services to the population in the first quarter of the current year. [paragraph continues]

The targets for housing repairs, the construction of garages and summer houses, and transport services were fulfilled by these enterprises to around 9 percent despite the fact that all these enterprises have construction and repair divisions and more than 60 percent of them own buses, trucks, and other means of transport. Only one conclusion can be drawn from this: Despite all the decisions adopted, union republic councils of ministers and local soviet organs are very poor at organizing work to expand paid services for the population by utilizing the potential of all enterprises regardless of their departmental affiliation. Party committees are instructed to rectify this situation without delay.

Cooperative and individual forms of labor activity are meant to substantially complement the state system in meeting Soviet people's requirements for goods and services. This work is only just getting off the ground, but wherever cooperatives are already in operation they are undoubtedly proving useful and the population welcomes this initiative.

In the RSFSR, for instance, around 1,200 cooperatives have already been established in consumer goods production, public catering, and consumer services. By the end of the year there will be more than 3,000 of them. Party and soviet organs in Estonia, Uzbekistan, and some other parts of the country are also tackling this quite well.

However, it must be admitted that in many places there is still evidence of passiveness and even of a wait-and-see attitude. Judging by letters received at the CPSU Central Committee and newspaper articles, citizens' initiative frequently runs into bureaucratic obstacles, indifference on the part of officials, or unwillingness on the part of local soviets, ministries, or enterprises to accept additional responsibility. All unjustified curbs in this area must be removed.

The further improvement of the Soviet people's well-being is not just a question of the quantity but also of the quality of the benefits which they enjoy. In resolving the tasks connected with saturating the market with goods and services this is the paramount problem today. However, the implementation of the measures outlined by the party and the government to radically improve output quality is proceeding with difficulty.

The quality of many articles is radically impaired as a result of people's irresponsible attitudes during the manufacture of these articles, and this is absolutely impermissible. The introduction of the state acceptance service has shown this up quite dramatically. At many enterprises infringements of technological discipline on a mass scale, deviations from the normative and technical documentation requirements, and negligency by suppliers of raw materials, accessories, and auxiliary materials have been exposed.

Last year the number of complaints about consumer goods and household appliances increased by 70 percent, about clothing articles by 24 percent, footwear by 13 percent, and knitwear by 7 percent. One-fourth of tape-recorders, one in three television sets, and one in two color television sets are either declared defective or sent back for repairs during the guarantee period.

In my view there can be no two opinions about this. The time has come to finally stem the flood of defective goods with which consumers are inundated. Some results will undoubtedly be produced in this connection by the transfer of industry and trade to the principles of self-financing and self-capitalization, when all losses incurred through the production of defective goods will have to be paid from enterprise material incentive funds.

At the same time, the cost of repairs of household appliances under guarantee is still borne by the consumer, and this is clearly not conducive to improving the quality of manufacture. In the opinion of scientists and specialists, these costs should be borne by the manufacturing enterprises. The Ministry of Finance, the State Committee on Prices, and the State Committee for Standards should elaborate these proposals.

Concern is being caused by the extremely slow increase in the production of cultural and consumer goods with excellent functional and user properties. Most of the consumer goods produced in our country are inferior to the best, and sometimes not even the best, similar foreign goods as regards technical standard and design and finish and cannot compete with them on the world market.

In light industry the share of goods with the "N" index is growing slowly, and this applies in particular to fashionable goods at contract prices, whose share last year was under 2 percent. The styling and the art and color finish of clothing, footwear, and fabrics are seriously lagging. Not enough goods for young people are being produced.

One of the main reasons for the standstill in the development of the range and quality of goods is the slow elaboration and introduction into production of new models of consumer goods. Only 5-8 percent of household appliances are updated annually, whereas in a number of foreign countries this indicator totals 25-30 percent. In our country, for instance 70 percent of washing machine designs are 30 years old.

The "Uralets" vacuum cleaner has been in production since 1954, that is, a third of a century, despite the fact that in comparison with modern models its labor intensiveness is 100 percent higher, it weighs 2 kg more, and its cost price is 30 percent higher. It appears that the manufacturing ministry — the USSR Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry — is operating on the well-known principle that, since vacuum cleaners are in short supply and consumers cannot be choosers, they will buy whatever we produce.

A serious impediment to the process of updating goods is the rigidity of the technology and the organization of goods production and an insufficiently receptive attitude to new and progressive ideas. For many enterprises and associations, switching to the production of more progressive goods is a painful process which calls for considerable efforts and material expenditure.

Clearly, great emphasis must be placed on the introduction of flexible, easily adjustable technologies. Ministries and soviet organs at local level must also step up their efforts in the establishment of small-scale enterprises which make it possible promptly to respond to the demands of the market and to organize the production of different articles for the population without much difficulty.

Simultaneously it is necessary to purposefully organize the study and shaping of the population's requirements and demand for goods and services. Studies of the market situation are at present carried out in piecemeal fashion without the necessary coordination between industry and trade. The USSR Ministry of Trade all-union scientific research institute for the study of the market situation and demand has failed to play an active role here. Yet it employs more than 500 people. Poor use is made of the potential of company stores and trade-and-industrial enterprises for defining the population's requirements for new goods.

We must seek to produce what sells, what people need today. To achieve this it is necessary to clearly define the functions of industry and trade in studying, shaping, and forecasting people's needs. It is impossible to achieve good results without such forecasts. The elaboration of a statewide system for the study and shaping of demand is seriously overdue.

Long-term goods production planning and forecasting is also undermined by a lack of conceptual plans concerning the range of goods. The USSR Ministry of the Light Industry, key ministries and departments, and the USSR Ministry of Trade have failed to embark on their elaboration despite the fact that the Comprehensive Program makes provision for the conclusion of long-term agreements on the development of the range of goods. Meanwhile, as the experience of our friends, primarily the GDR and Czechoslovakia, indicates, this can be very useful.

In summary, I would like to emphasize that in questions of the technical standard, quality, and range of goods we have set ourselves high aims. Our backwardness in this matter is wounding people's pride, is producing a kind of inferiority complex, and people claim that in our country all goods are poor while abroad they are invariably better. The only answer to this is good work and the production of more goods of world standard. This is the direction in which party committees must point economic managers and labor collectives.

A breakthrough in the solution of this task can only be achieved on the basis of accelerated scientific and technical progress and a better utilization of the potential of fundamental and industrial sector science.

Today as never before there is a clear need for in-depth theoretical research into both the problems of goods and services production technology and techniques and questions of the shaping and development of needs in a socialist society. Essentially this is a question of deepening the scientific base of our policy in this area. I am hoping that the USSR Academy of Sciences leadership will make provision for the appropriate studies in the plans for fundamental research.

At the same time I would like to emphasize in particular that the main role in elaborating new, modern types of household appliances and other industrial goods belongs to industrial sector science. It is the industrial sector scientific research and design organizations rather than anyone else that bear the full responsibility for the technical standard and quality of consumer goods. We have good reason to voice complaints against them today.

In most cases, the scientific and design subdivisions which engage in the elaboration of consumer goods are squeezing out a miserable existence. They are understaffed in terms of skilled cadres and have poor test-and-experimental facilities. The volume of their research and design work does not correspond to the science- and design-intensiveness of modern household appliances or to the scale on which they are manufactured.

According to USSR Central Statistical Administration data, the share of scientific research and experimental and design work connected with the production of consumer goods totaled only 1.8 percent of the overall expenditure for scientific research and experimental and design work in the machine building complex in 1986. Meanwhile consumer goods account for 12 percent of the total output volume of this complex.

Preparing for this conference, CPSU Central Committee departments studied the targeted comprehensive scientific and technical programmes for the establishment and assimilation of consumer goods production approved by the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology for the current 5-year plan. It emerged that all nine programs make provision for carrying out only partial tasks. Furthermore, the deadlines for their implementation are extremely long and a real return on their implementation is basically not expected until the next 5-year plan. The question arises of how, given this approach, we can expect to achieve a radical improvement in the quality and range of goods in the next few years?

Key ministries and their scientific research organizations and design bureaus have failed to ensure the implementation of an integrated technical policy in the production of consumer goods and household appliances. This has resulted in unjustified duplication in the production of household appliances.

Judge for yourselves. Our industry is currently producing 47 models of washing machines, 53 models of refrigerators, and 60 models of television sets which essentially do not differ greatly in their technical specifications and user qualities but are virtually unstandardized.

All this merely creates the semblance of a wide range of goods, complicates the production of spare parts and repairs and makes them more expensive, and produces considerable fluctuations in the cost price of goods.

In this context, it appears expedient for the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology together with interested ministries and departments to carry out an expert assessment of the technical standard of the most important types of household appliances on the lines of what has recently been carried out for all machine-building output. Here it will be absolutely necessary to take into account the opinion of consumers which has, up to now, been largely ignored in the assessment of goods quality.

Of course, it is necessary in the near future to complete the elaboration of the proposals to enhance the responsibility and expand the rights of key ministries as envisaged in the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Minister resolution on the Comprehensive Program.

The accelerated development of consumer goods production and the service sphere calls for the radical modernization of the material and technical base of these national economic sectors. In the current 5-year plan 50 percent more capital investment funds than in the previous 5-year plan have been allocated for this purpose.

However, in a number of ministries the approach based on the utilization of only residual resources for this purpose has still not been overcome. In the Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production, the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building, and in the metallurgical and construction sectors, for instance, less than 1 percent of all capital investments for industrial construction are spent on the development of material and technical base of goods production.

As a result of having ministries conduct policy, a tangible disproportion has formed. Capital investments channeled into development of the production of nonfood goods during the current 5-year plan will amount to only 3.3 percent of the total volume of appropriations for industrial construction. At the same time the share of these goods in the total volume of industrial output will increase to 20 percent.

Local organs and associations and enterprise leaders can do a great deal to consolidate the material and technical base. In Kerovo Oblast, for instance, 22 projects funded by USSR State Bank credits were commissioned in 1986 alone. An installation for the production of new three-compartment refrigerators is currently under construction at the ZIL association, funded from the same sources.

However, there are not many examples of this kind. In a number of republics, krais, and oblasts party and soviet organs have relaxed supervision of the assimilation of even centrally distributed capital investments.

For instance, on the construction of the Priluki, Borisoglebsk, Sumy, and Bukhara footwear factories, the assimilation of funds totaled less than 40 percent compared to last year -- and that while there is an acute shortage of footwear in the country. Overall, there is an annual shortfall in the assimilation of allocated funds on consumer goods production, trade, and service sphere construction projects of about 15 percent. Can this be regarded as normal?

The retooling of these sectors is being seriously held up by a shortage of modern technological equipment. However, the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances, the Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry, the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building, and a number of other ministries are not meeting the set targets for the production of this equipment. The underrating by ministries, departments, and local soviet and economic organs of the importance of the construction and reconstruction of light and coal industry enterprises and trade and service sphere facilities must be resolutely overcome.

Party organizations must spearhead work to accelerate the development of consumer goods production and the service sphere. They are the force which must ensure consistency and purposefulness in the implementation of the Comprehensive Program and the annual and 5-year plans and back up the initiative and search for reserves to ensure a fuller satisfaction of the population's effective demand.

The party committee's paramount task is to provide the political, ideological, and organization backup for the fulfillment of the resolutions and decisions adopted on these questions. It is necessary to increase the demands of ministries, departments, soviet and economic organs, and enterprise and association managers and to enhance their responsibility for the fulfillment of the set targets on time and in full. The fruits of practical work are the main criteria of restructuring -- practical, rather than verbal restructuring.

In this context it must be admitted that many union republic Communist Party central committees, party kraykoms and obkoms, and CPSU Central Committee industrial sector departments have still not ensured the necessary monitoring of the activity of ministries and departments in the implementation of the Comprehensive Program. This is illustrated by the fact that not one of the 19 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolutions is being fully implemented.

It is not necessary in this company to speak at length about the role of the chemical industry in the production of modern high-quality goods. Industry's needs for various types of chemical materials, decorative plastic cloth, dyes, and the other goods are currently met less than 50 percent. Their utilization in the production of goods remains the lowest among many developed countries.

For instance, the share of chemical fibers and yarns in the total volume of textile industry raw materials amounts to around 30 percent in our country and 70 percent in the United States.

Bearing this in mind, a special resolution was adopted within the Comprehensive Program on developing the production of progressive chemical materials. However, the Ministry of the Chemical Industry is planning to commission within the current 5-year plan only just over 80 percent of the capacities for the production of chemical fibers and yarns provided for in the resolution. Decisions on additional measures to develop small-scale chemical industry capacities are also being implemented unsatisfactorily.

The quality of natural raw materials -- cotton, flax, wool, and leather -- has remained low for many years, and industry's needs for specific types of these raw materials are not being taken in to account. This is making it seriously more difficult to improve the quality of light industry goods and compelling us to spend foreign currency on imports of raw materials. The USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee and union republic councils of ministers must take resolute steps to rectify the situation, especially in the cotton growing republics.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers directive that the production of consumer goods be provided with the necessary material and technical resources is not being implemented in full. Our planning and supply departments must put an end to this practice. It dampens people's enthusiasm and makes it impossible to organize labor collectives' stable and rhythmical work.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution improving foreign economic activity opens up great opportunities for augmenting high-quality consumer goods resources. However, so far ministries, associations, and enterprises have failed to show the necessary initiative and enterprise in its implementation, and effective forms of cooperation such as the establishment of direct contacts, the creation of joint enterprises, and the organization of joint collectives for the solution of long-term scientific and technical problems are being developed slowly.

It is necessary to seriously change the style and methods of ministries' work in the solution of intersector questions. People have gotten used to resorting to bureaucratic methods in this area -- you send your piece of paper and you forget the matter. The question has been raised, and there is plenty to fall back on. This style has been condemned by the party Central Committee. Ministry leaders must maintain constant businesslike contacts and jointly seek and find solutions to problems. This also applies to union republic councils of ministers, local soviet organs, and associations and enterprises.

The tasks we are discussing today are part and parcel of the party's work in restructuring. And the party's backup for restructuring means above all providing it with cadres.

Party committees must purposefully reinforce the leading cadre component with fresh forces so as to ensure that the process of renewal proceeds uninterruptedly and continuity is maintained. In line with the demands of the January Plenum, it is very important to ensure that every consumer goods production and service sphere management sector is headed by people with high professional qualities, people who are energetic, enterprising, intolerant of any deviations from the norms of socialist morality, and capable of working in an atmosphere of deepening democracy.

Present-day conditions demand that leaders master the economic methods of management in depth. The switching of light industry, trade, and consumer services to principles of full economic accountability, self-financing, and self-capitalization has shown that this process is not proceeding without difficulty. There is evidence of an inability among most management workers to think in financial and economic categories and of a lack not just of the appropriate routines but also of willingness on the part of these workers to involve themselves in these questions. Party committees must attend to raising the standard of economic training for all cadres.

In our time excellent user and aesthetic properties in goods depend on good design. Last year the CPSU Central Committee adopted a special decision on the further development of artistic design and a USSR Union of Designers was set up.

Nonetheless, by no means all people have understood the importance of design. Through 1995 the ministries' requirements for design cadres are limited on average to five specialists per sector per year. Cadre services' sluggishness is the only possible explanation for this.

The problem of stemming the turnover of worker cadres in production remains acute in light and local industry, trade, and the service sphere. The main reason for the high turnover is the unsatisfactory solution of housing and other social problems.

The CPSU Central Committee and the government have adopted a number of measures aimed at improving the social and living conditions of workers in these sectors. However, this will not happen automatically. It requires persistent efforts on the part of ministries, departments, associations, enterprises, and local soviets and active support and strict supervision by party organizations.

The successful development of consumer goods production and the service sphere will depend largely on the standard of organizational and educational work in labor collectives. Party organizations are called upon to make effective use of such important levers for mobilizing the masses' labor and social activeness as socialist competition, the introduction of progressive experience, and objective publicity on the achievements of enterprises, regions, and sectors.

Soviet people must be able to feel the results of restructuring as soon as possible; they must be able to see changes for the better in the social sphere and in the satisfaction of their needs for goods and services.

SAMSONOV ON STALIN'S ACTUAL, NOT 'ALTERED' RECORD

PM260800 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 24 May 87 p 3

[Article by Academician A. Samsonov in response to reader's letter, under the new rubric "From Different Viewpoints": "History Must Not Be Forgotten...but Nor Must It Be Altered"]

[Text] History Must Not Be Forgotten [subhead]

I follow our country's political life very attentively. [paragraph continues]

I read the report at the April 1985 Plenum, the Political Report to the 27th CPSU Congress, and the January Plenum materials with a pencil in my hand. I am entirely in favor of what is now happening in our country. But I do not agree with one very important aspect. Openness will be incomplete unless we name those whose fault it was that all this happened in the country.

We all remember how N.S. Khrushchev assessed the activity of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. But I have here a book published in 1976, which talks about party history. I have read it several times. The book speaks well of Stalin, with certain criticisms, it is true. I.V. Stalin supposedly took all the credit for the party's merits. Let me quote an extract from this book. It says that the Trotskyists, fighting against the party line on building socialism in the USSR, sowed capitulatory ideas among the workers. From their viewpoint there was only one thing left for the working class to do — to go cap in hand to the capitalists and give itself up. The "new opposition" attempted to substitute Trotskyism for Leninism. But this attempt was exposed by the party, with the help of I.V. Stalin's book "On Questions of Leninism" ["K. Voprosam Leninizma"]

And who was head of the party at that time? I.V. Stalin. It was not Stalin's fault that at that time the people believed in the cult of Stalin. Stalin did not make the men who marched into the attack shout "For the Motherland, for Stalin!" Stalin enjoyed great respect, love, and trust among the Soviet people. Stalin did much for his people, and the people did much for the country and for Stalin. We lived and worked as one big Soviet family for the sake of the Motherland.

Stalin's name should be immortalized in granite, bronze, even gold. That would also be a reward for those who fought for socialism, who defended socialism in the Great Patriotic War, who raised the cities from the ruins. We have had socialism in our country for nearly 70 years now, yet we still cannot manage to take the truth path.

But at that time everything was new. Socialism's enemies were many and we did not know whom to brush aside, or how. Nobody offered us socialism on a plate. We could not get by without any mistakes.

So history must not be forgotten, it should be studied.

I am a driver, aged 57, and I live in Penza.

Ivan Yevseyevich Karasev.

Academician A. Samsonov Replies to Driver I. Karasev: ...But Nor Must It Be Altered
[subhead]

[Editorial introduction to Samsonov reply] The history of a country in which "everything was new" interests everyone passionately -- drivers and engineers, poets and academicians. Our nonstaff correspondent Edmund Iodkovskiy submitted Ivan Yevseyevich Karasev's letter to Academician Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Samsonov, the well known Soviet historian and author of the seminal books "World War II" ["Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna"], "The Defeat of the Wehrmacht at Moscow" ["Porazheniye Vermakhta pod Moskvoy"], "The Battle of Stalingrad" ["Stalingradskaya Bitva"], "From the Volga to the Baltic" ["Ot Volgi do Baltiki"] and many others. His military career began in the frosty winter of 1939 in the Baltic; the future academician spent the Great Patriotic War with the 3d Guards Stalingrad Mechanized Corps, and at the front he was awarded the Orders of the Red Star and the Patriotic War Second Class.

The academician's desk was strewn with the pages of the manuscript for the book "Memory of the Past: Events, People, History" ["Pamyat Minuvshego: Sobytiya, Lyudi, Istoriya"], in which he writes about his generation and the development of the science of history with all its achievements, difficulties, and shortcomings. Despite being very busy Aleksandr Mikhaylovich agreed to reply to the letter from the driver from Penza.

[Samsonov] I am pleased to see Ivan Yevseyevich Karasev's deep interest in history and his desire to get to the bottom of everything and give everyone their due. He proposes erecting a monument to I.V. Stalin. In support of his idea he writes, in particular, that in the years of the terrible trials of war the Soviet servicemen went into the attack with the cry "For the Motherland, for Stalin!"

My own experience at the front enables me to say confidently: All kinds of things happened at the front, but Soviet people were fighting for the Motherland, and not for one man. There is no denying that the formula quoted by your reader did occur in the press, including the frontline press (newspapers, pamphlets), but that was one manifestation of the personality cult. The widespread legend about the formula "For the Motherland, for Stalin!" was also promoted by letters from the command to the widows of the fallen. For instance, the widow of my friend Nikolay Kruglov received such a letter from the front, which I quote in my new book:

"On the night of 31 August-1 September 1942 Nikolay Alekseyevich died a hero's death in fierce fighting, as a true patriot of the Motherland, with the words 'For the Motherland, for Stalin!'"

But I knowing well the views of my Leningrad comrade and remembering our prewar conversations about Stalin, I cannot believe to this day that he went into the attack with those words. Nikolay Kruglov died a hero, but his last words were clearly invented.

The very principle of the personality cult is alien to the society created by Great October. Because the people emancipated by the revolution are for the authority of leaders, but against their deification: V.I. Lenin taught us that, and set a fine personal example. The creator of mankind's history has always been the people's masses, not individuals.

Does this mean Stalin rendered the people no service? No, of course not, he did render services: in the implementation of the plans for socialist building, in the strengthening of the country's defense capability, in the leadership of the army in the years of the war against fascist aggression. But it is not correct to associate all the successes achieved by the party and people with Stalin's name, attributing to him the qualities of "brilliant leader of the peoples" and "great military captain."

It is my conviction that Stalin was neither a brilliant leader [vozhd] nor a great military captain, because he made mistakes which had tragic consequences. He also promoted the establishment of the personality cult which is alien to Marxism-Leninism (I. Karasev is not right when he says "Stalin was not to blame for that"). Thus in 1937, when socialism had already conquered in our country, Stalin asserted that as we move toward socialism the class struggle is exacerbated. This theoretically erroneous proposition served in practice as a justification for gross violations of the rule of law, unjustified mass repressions, and the encouragement of slanderers and anonymous letter writers; careerists who had made their way into party and soviet organs operated under cover of slogans about vigilance. All this led to the whipping up of an atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty.

The complex negative consequences were exacerbated by the fact that party and government monitoring of the state security organs was replaced by Stalin's personal monitoring, and this promoted criminal activity not only by Yagoda, Yezhov, and Beria, but also by other true enemies of the people.

An example: Seeking to weaken the Soviet Union, the German fascists forged false documents about a supposed counterrevolutionary conspiracy within the top command of the Red Army -- the so-called "Tukhachevskiy conspiracy." German documents were cunningly passed via Prague to Moscow, and the monstrous provocation succeeded. The victims were the major Soviet military leaders M.N. Tukhachevskiy, I.E. Yakir, V.K. Blyukher, I.P. Uborevich, and A.I. Yegorov and many other officer cadres in the military districts. All this helped free the hands of the German General Staff and promoted the elaboration of the "Barbarossa" plan.

Although on the eve of the war some of those who had been repressed were rehabilitated (among them K.K. Rokossovskiy), serious damage had already been done as a result of the unjustified repressions.

Many books and studies have been written about the Great Patriotic War, but historical literature does not by any means accurately and factually reproduce everything. Our military doctrine, prior to the Hitlerite aggression, declared: If the enemy attacks, we will wage war on his territory. It turned out quite differently; the error in determining the timing of the attack proved fatal. A.M. Vasilyevskiy wrote on this subject:

"...Stalin's tough line on doing nothing that Germany could use as grounds for unleashing war was justified by the historical interests of the socialist motherland. But his fault was that he did not see, did not grasp the limit beyond which this policy became not only unnecessary, but dangerous. This limit should have been boldly crossed, the Armed Forces placed on full readiness as quickly as possible, mobilization carried out, and the country turned into a military camp. The time should clearly have been extended to somewhere in the region of June (1941) as a maximum, but the work which could be done openly should have been carried out earlier. There was sufficient evidence that Germany was preparing itself for a military attack on our country -- in our age it is hard to conceal such evidence."

As early as 5 March 1941 Richard Sorge copied and sent to the USSR photocopies of top secret documents -- telegrams from Ribbentrop to Ott, the ambassador in Tokyo, about Germany's planned attack on the USSR in the second half of June, on 19 May he reported accurate figures on the concentration on the USSR's western borders of 150 German divisions, and on 15 June, a week before the invasion, in the face of incredible difficulties and at the risk of his life, he managed to send to Moscow a report which was brief, but of the utmost importance: "The war will begin 22 June."

Nonetheless our troops were not placed on combat readiness in good time. At the same time they were banned from firing on German aircraft which violated the border. Between October 1940 and June 1941 185 planes violated the USSR's state border. It is well known that the German airmen photographed military targets. In May and June 1941 the border guards arrested 461 border violators. Subversive groups with weapons and radio equipment were sent into our territory. In a word, the story about "Germany's surprise attack on the USSR" cannot be accepted unreservedly; in fact everything was far more complex. The German Supreme Command carried out successful disinformation of the Soviet side, fabricating materials which ended up on Stalin's desk.

I am convinced that were it not for Stalin's errors, the Wehrmacht's troops, even if they had penetrated our territory, would not have advanced as far as Leningrad and Moscow. The fatal mistakes made on the eve of the war resulted in tragedy for the surrounded armies: Historians allude only vaguely to this, yet more than one of our armies was surrounded: in 1941 -- in the region of Uman, near Kiev, and in the region of Vyazma, and in 1942 -- in the region of Kharkov.

It is by no means easy to assess Stalin's role in the war. But he was not a great captain. He committed major errors in the leadership of the armed struggle from the beginning of the war through the fall of 1942. But after that, relying on the professional knowledge of the military, he successfully mastered the experience of contemporary warfare -- and as supreme commander in chief and chairman of the State Committee for Defense he played an important role in the Soviet people's victory.

If we are talking about the great captain of World War II, that was four times Hero of the Soviet Union Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov. The international publication "Illustrated History of the Second World War" (Purnell publishing house, London, 1966-1968) entitled the 16th section of the 2d volume, devoted to him, "The General Who Never Lost a Battle," and that is true.

Now let us turn to the events of 1942. The Hitlerite command once again succeeded in disinforming Stalin.

In the book "The Battle of Stalingrad," my doctoral dissertation, I wrote: "Among the measures taken by the Hitlerite command...not the least was the plan for the fictitious operation 'Kremlin.' Its aim was the disinformation of the Soviet command with regard to the German plans for the summer campaign in 1942. Operation 'Kremlin' was planned on the instructions of the OKH (general staff of the ground forces) and Hitler, by the staff of the army group 'Center.' In the 'Order for an Offensive on Moscow,' signed 29 May by Commander in Chief Field Marshal Kluge and Chief of Staff General Veler [name as published], the troops of Army Group 'Center' were set this task: '...To take firm possession of the territory around Moscow, encircling the city...' To achieve this goal the order set concrete tasks for the 2d and 3d Tank Corps, the 4th and 9th Armies, and the 59th Army Corps. The start of the two operations (the fictitious 'Kremlin' and the genuine 'Blau,' the breakthrough to the south to seize the Caucasus) coincided. The enemy did everything, including false radio information, to ensure that the plan for operation 'Kremlin' became known to the Red Army command. To some extent the enemy succeeded in this ruse...Although as early as 23 March state security organs reported to the State Committee for Defense: 'The main strike will be in the southern sector, with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and then in the direction of the Caspian Sea. By this means the Germans hope to reach the Caucasian oil sources.'"

The retreat in summer 1942 was not inevitable, but Stalin did not believe the accurate information from Soviet intelligence.

The famous Order 227 of the supreme commander in chief of 28 July 1942 is known in the literature as "Not a Step Backward," but to this day it has not been published in full (in the fourth edition of "The Battle of Stalingrad," now in preparation, I am trying to quote it with no omissions). Because it said bluntly and directly that the country was in a desperate position and there must be no further retreat. War veterans know: It was very harsh. Nonetheless it was necessary in the situation then prevailing. It did much to bring about a turning point at the front. The 126th Rifle Division headed by its commander Colonel V.Ye. Sorokin, for instance, fell, on its defensive line, but it did not retreat.

The fate of our troops engaged in fighting while surrounded, on the distant approaches to Stalingrad, was equally tragic. I asked for military archives clarifying the fate of the 33d Guards and 181st and 192d Divisions, but I was told that no documents were preserved, they were all destroyed while the troops were surrounded. Only one option is left — to seek actual participants in the events, and there are fewer of them all the time. During the war a demand was made on all fighting men, from soldiers to top officer personnel: If you find yourself in a hopeless situation, you should choose death, not captivity. So being surrounded or taken captive was considered shameful. Those who found themselves in that situation were treated with great suspicion. In a word, all these are still undiscovered pages of the war, the "uncharted territory" of history. It is very difficult to approach them.

Incidentally, the first works devoted to the fate of the surrounded armies came from the pens of literary men, not historians (Ye. Dolmatovskiy's "Zelenaya Brama"). I regard this as a valuable book.

But here it must be recalled that history cannot be studied solely from novels and movies. The true facts about the past are also smoothed over by those historians who have not overcome subjectivity and are inclined to varnish events. A historian cannot always agree with the interpretation of past events found in artistic works, but much is revealed with historical accuracy and great force.

In this connection let me dwell on I. Stadnyuk's novel "War" ["Voyna"]. The novel analyzes in detail the tragic fate of the first commander of the Western Front, Army General D.G. Pavlov, and his closest aides, Major Generals V.Ye. Klimovskiy, A.G. Grigoryev, N.A. Klych, and A.A. Korobkov. On the 9th day of the war they were relieved of their duties and brought before a military tribunal. Alas, many pages of the novel resound with the motifs of the special guilt of the former leaders of the Western Front in connection with the country's critical military position. Thus it is instilled in the reader that it was the command which was to blame for the incomplete combat readiness of the Western Front troops, and then for their criminal inability to lead them in the fighting which developed. There is a surprising, terribly bald statement when, parrying Timoshenko's objection about the impossibility of collusion between Pavlov and the fascists, Mekhlis says: "After all, we have to think how to explain to our people and the whole world why the Red Army is retreating..." The perfidious story about collusion between Pavlov and the Hitlerites was refuted by Stalin, but the accusation of criminal inactivity remained. The novelist to some extent attributes such thoughts to Pavlov himself, too: "And, looking truth in the face, he had to admit that on the threshold of the war, as a district commander, he had left undone much that it was his duty to do."

However, in the language of lawyers, the formula "left much undone" is not equivalent to the formulas "crime" or "treason." On the first day of the war 1,200 of our aircraft were destroyed on the airfields and in unequal battles, communications were disorganized, and control of the troops was lost for some time. But this happened not only in the western salient, where the enemy inflicted the main strike. Did not almost the same thing happen in the northwest and southwest salients? It is time to say openly: D.G. Pavlov and his comrades in arms were not guilty of the crime of which they were accused.

The stern retribution, the moral justice of the firing squads is also substantiated, in I. Stadnyuk's book, in a conversation between Stalin and B.M. Shaposhnikov. Yet in peacetime too Stalin sent to the firing squad, on various pretexts, all who came out against him....

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I hope Ivan Yevseyevich Karasev has already seen the movie "Repentance"? It stuns the viewers. Its meaning is directed to our historical memory, the lessons of the older generations.

No, all this must not be forgotten, we must not reassure ourselves with the fact that Soviet society has secured impressive victories in every sphere of material and spiritual life. Ivan Yevseyevich himself writes that "history must not be forgotten." So where is the difference in our positions?

The point is that Stalin's cult of personality was condemned not by N.S. Khrushchev alone, but by the entire party and by the CPSU Central Committee resolution of 30 June 1956 "On Overcoming the Personality Cult and Its Consequences"; this resolution also recalled that in late 1922 and early 1923 V.I. Lenin, in the well known "Letter to the Congress," recommended that Stalin be transferred from the post of general secretary because of some of his personal qualities.

We are now going through a process of revolutionary renewal of society, based on the most important gains of socialism, including democracy, openness, and conscious participation in labor and social activity. To overcome the inertia which retards our progress is impossible without the truth about the past.

In conclusion I would like to wish you all the best, Ivan Yevseyevich -- and of course, I advise you to think more deeply about the assessment of I.V. Stalin's role in the history of the past.